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GOSSIPING ABOUT JUDGES
JORDAN M. SINGER*
ABSTRACT
Gossip about judges is an essential source of information to civil litigators. Hearing
third party assessments of a judge’s personality, demeanor, intelligence, curiosity, and
openness to new interpretations of the law can substantially affect a lawyer’s strategic deci
sions during the course of litigation, and sometimes whether litigation occurs at all. Yet
gossip about judges rarely merits mention and has evaded serious study.
This Article brings attorney gossip about judges out into the open, identifying its strate
gic benefits and drawbacks and explaining how attorneys use gossip (and other secondhand
information on judges) to anticipate the likely outcome of judicial decisions. It further ex
plains how common attorney practices in modern civil litigation unintentionally compro
mise the accuracy and reliability of gossip about judges and offers some thoughts on restor
ing the full value of this little discussed resource.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers deal in information. It is the primary tool of the trade,
the essence of the profession.1 The skill and competence of a lawyer is
measured in significant part by his or her ability to locate, digest,
and present information that governs and reflects human interactions. And yet one of the most substantial and important sources of
information available to litigation attorneys—one on which they rely
routinely, extensively, and often automatically—rarely merits mention. That source of information is gossip.
Gossip—which I use here to denote all forms of evaluative
secondhand information about a person shared outside that person’s
presence—is ubiquitous in civil litigation. Far from its reputation as
idle or sinister talk, it plays an essential role in the development of
litigation strategy. In particular, information gleaned from gossip
enables attorneys to form impressions about the key players in a
case.2 In turn, these impressions—of opposing counsel, potential witnesses, judges, jurors, and even the attorney’s own clients—help the
attorney predict, explain, and influence outcomes during the course
of litigation. As a result, gossip serves as a crucial supplement to, and
frequently a substitute for, information obtained from published
sources and through direct interaction with key players.
While the search for and use of gossip is applicable to all individuals involved in a case, my focus here is on gossip about trial judges—
and more specifically, federal district judges. How attorneys form impressions of these judges has enormous practical importance. District
judges are imbued with substantial procedural discretion throughout
the civil pretrial and trial process, especially in areas such as discovery, scheduling, the admission of evidence, and the imposition of
sanctions. They have considerable interpretative flexibility in emerging or unsettled areas of substantive law. Even in areas where judicial discretion is arguably more restrained by well-settled law and
procedural rules, there is an inevitable human element to judicial
decision-making.3 And because judges are not interchangeable, lawyers need to get to know them through all available means. Information on a judge’s personality, demeanor, intelligence, curiosity,
1. One commentator has suggested that as a group, only historians seek, collect, and
analyze information more than lawyers. Japhet Otike, The Information Needs and Seeking
Habits of Lawyers in England: A Pilot Study, 31 INT’L INFO. & LIBR. REV. 19, 20 (1999).
2. See, e.g., Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E Discovery
Frontier, 66 BENCH & B. MINN. 22 (2009); Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in
the Digital Age: One Click at a Time, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 611 (2012); Eric P. Robinson,
Virtual Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics of Investigating Jurors Online, 36 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 597 (2013).
3. Chad M. Oldfather, Judges as Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the Prob
lems of Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 125 (2007).
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openness to new interpretations of the law, and perceptions of the
strength of the case can substantially affect a lawyer’s strategic decisions during the course of litigation and sometimes even affect
whether litigation occurs at all.
Despite these useful qualities, and although the role of gossip in
other professional settings has been extensively analyzed, gossip
about judges has evaded serious academic inquiry.4 Part of the problem is its naturally low profile: gossip is effectively information in the
shadows. Few practitioners have written about it; fewer still have
admitted to engaging in it.5 It is often transmitted quietly and privately,6 making it difficult to observe and study empirically.7 Scholars, too, have largely ignored the importance of gossip—and its
cousin, judicial reputation—in attorney decision-making. The extant
scholarship on judicial reputation is concerned almost exclusively
with the judge’s perspective: how reputational concerns motivate
judges to decide cases,8 for example, or how judges attempt to manipulate their reputations to secure promotion, influence, or their own
public legacies.9 That is fine as it goes, but litigation attorneys—not
judges—are the primary creators, users, and manipulators of a trial
judge’s reputation. Understanding their perspective, then, would

4. This is the case, until relatively recently, even for the study of gossip in social and
other non professional settings. See Eric K. Foster, Research on Gossip: Taxonomy, Meth
ods, and Future Directions, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 78, 80 (2004) (“Psychology researchers
have largely overlooked gossip.”).
5. But see Amy B. Auth, Book Review, FED. LAW., June 2009, at 79, 79 (reviewing
JAMES P. GRAY, WEARING THE ROBE: THE ART AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF JUDGING IN
TODAY’S COURTS (2007)).
6. See JACK LEVIN & ARNOLD ARLUKE, GOSSIP: THE INSIDE SCOOP 8 (1987) (“The
information transmitted [by gossip] is typically not yet widely known . . . . [W]e are, at
least for a moment, among the privileged few who have it.”)
7. Notwithstanding the practical difficulty, one set of researchers has attempted to
study gossip experimentally through the use of “fictional gossip episodes.” David Sloan
Wilson et al., Gossip and Other Aspects of Language as Group Level Adaptations, in THE
EVOLUTION OF COGNITION 347, 348 (Cecilia Heyes & Ludwig Huber eds., 2000).
8. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determi
nants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 629 (2000) (suggesting that “for Su
preme Court Justices, substantive outcome was a more accurate predictor of judicial repu
tation than either quotability or a large number of process based and substance
independent indicia of judicial craft”).
9. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (1990); Nuno
Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Audiences and Reputation: Perspectives from Compara
tive Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 452 53 (2009) [hereinafter Garoupa & Gins
burg, Judicial Audiences]; Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and
the Organization of the Judiciary, 4 J. COMP. L. 226, 229 30 (2009) [hereinafter Garou
pa & Ginsburg, Reputation]; Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation and Judicial
Decision Making, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31 (1994).
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seem to be of enormous practical and theoretical value for all users of
the civil justice system.10
There is also some urgency to studying gossip about judges, because gossip is poised to take on a much more important role in attorney decision-making in the federal courts in the coming years.
Opportunities for direct interaction between attorneys and judges are
rapidly diminishing. Total courtroom time in the federal district
courts fell by nearly ten percent between 2007 and 2012, providing
fewer opportunities for attorneys to enjoy direct encounters (and especially repeated encounters) with judges in a courtroom setting.
Moreover, lawyers are more frequently choosing litigation strategies
that deny them repeated professional exposure to their local federal
judges. Pressure to reduce the time and cost of litigation has encouraged counsel to seek resolution of cases at the earliest possible stage,
decreasing their opportunities to interact with judges during latestage events leading up to trial. Growing efforts to avoid certain
judges through forum shopping or extrajudicial resolution hampers
the ability to develop robust professional relationships with the judiciary. And the rise of multijurisdictional practice has made it at least
somewhat less likely that lead counsel in a case will regularly work
and interact in the same legal community as the judge before whom
they appear. Collectively, these trends suggest a twenty-first century
litigation landscape in which meaningful opportunities for repeated,
direct interaction between bench and bar will be increasingly difficult
to come by.
A drop in direct interaction is a boon for gossip. Attorneys’ needs
for information on judges will not disappear even as face-to-face
meetings with them do, and secondhand information will be required
to fill the gap. Gossip will become more important to an attorney’s
strategic calculus, and litigators will increasingly rely on information
gleaned from colleagues, local counsel, public evaluations, and even
the internet to supplement or substitute for their personal knowledge
and experience with the judge.
The fact that gossip may be increasingly relied upon, however, is
unlikely to make it more reliable—at least in the sense of more likely
to accurately and adequately reflect the judge’s true behaviors and
inclinations. Quite the opposite. Like the children’s game of “telephone,” in which a communication invariably becomes more corrupted as it is transmitted farther from its original source, gossip and
other secondhand information decline in reliability as they grow in
10. For a forceful commentary on this point, see Ronald K.L. Collins, Litigation
Scholarship 3 4 (Univ. of Wash. School of Law, Research Paper No. 2013 22), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276234.
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circulation. Gossip’s utility, in other words, requires people to experience healthy levels of direct interaction to serve as a check on the veracity of secondhand information. If opportunities for personal interactions between judges and attorneys continue to decline, the gossip
that rushes in to fill the void will be of increasingly questionable value.
Not all gossip will be unreliable, of course. Even in an age of declining direct interaction, some lawyers will continue to interact repeatedly with judges and have a strong sense of a particular judge’s
sensibilities and predilections. But just as accessible gossip is likely
to become less reliable, such sources of reliable gossip are likely to
become less accessible. That is, gossip that acts as an accurate predictor of the judge’s behavior and decisions will become a scarcer
commodity, and will be valued as such by those who possess it. Attorneys who cannot access important gossip—because they are new
to the profession, do not practice regularly in that courthouse or jurisdiction, or simply are not connected to the right people—will have
less access to the judge’s decision-making process or the judge himself, with predictably troubling access issues for their clients as well.
In light of gossip’s potential power in litigation, its unexamined
status is no longer justifiable. This Article accordingly brings attorney gossip about judges out of the shadows, so that its power and its
pitfalls can be better understood. Part II describes the informational
strengths of gossip, in particular its ability to help attorneys predict
and influence litigation outcomes and enforce a stable local litigation
culture. Part III turns to gossip’s weaknesses, drawing upon the cognitive and psychological literature to show how the transmission of
secondhand information is susceptible to distortion and how attorneys attempt to compensate for those distortions. Part IV then specifically considers the future of gossip in one forum for which data are
readily available: the federal district courts. That Part identifies a
precipitous drop in direct courtroom time between judges and lawyers and explains how the changing face of attorney-judge interaction
threatens to make accessible gossip less reliable, and reliable gossip
less accessible, in the coming years. Finally, Part V examines some
possible approaches for reversing this trend and improving the quality of gossip about judges in a civil litigation setting.
II. WHY GOSSIP ABOUT JUDGES?
A. Gossip as a Source of Information
At first, gossip may seem an unlikely information source for litigators. We are accustomed to the idea of attorneys poring through statutory text and case law to fashion legal arguments, reviewing documents and deposition transcripts to compile evidence and factual
background, or (more recently) using aggregated litigation data to
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better organize, contextualize, and predict the outcomes of their arguments before the court.11 Each of these sources carries the weight
of perceived objectivity: statutes and case law reflect legal precedent,
evidentiary sources reflect historical fact, and aggregate data reflect
empirical reality. Gossip, by contrast, has “a decidedly shady reputation.”12 Historically, it has been seen as a “malicious, destructive, and
largely reprehensible” activity.13 Even under more forgiving modern
standards, many people today still view gossip primarily as “idle
talk” undertaken purely for the sake of entertainment14—the equivalent of “intellectual chewing gum.”15
But this lightweight reputation is undeserved, or at least overstated. Gossip in fact has a variety of valuable social and informational effects. Most importantly, information spread through gossip
always has an evaluative dimension,16 a useful characteristic that is
typically absent from other sources of information available to the
litigator. Consider, for example, the statement that “Judge Jones is
eligible to take senior status.” Taken alone, that information is of
little strategic value to a lawyer. Perhaps it allows general inferences about Judge Jones’s age, experience, and seniority, but as a
basic fact it provides little to work with. But now consider the following exchange:
11. See generally Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of
Big Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2325137.
12. R. I. M. Dunbar, Gossip in Evolutionary Perspective, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 100,
100 (2004).
13. Id. Some societies have even made gossiping a punishable offense. Nicholas Em
ler, Gossip, Reputation, and Social Adaptation, in GOOD GOSSIP 117, 119 (Robert F. Good
man & Aaron Ben Ze’ev eds., 1994) (describing forms of punishment in fourteenth to
eighteenth century Britain, ranging from public shaming to medieval torture devices); see
also LEVIN & ARLUKE, supra note 6, at 3 4 (1987) (discussing cultural critiques of gossip in
West Africa, within the Seminole Indian tribe, and among twentieth century American
journalists).
14. Gary Alan Fine & Ralph L. Rosnow, Gossip, Gossipers, Gossiping, 4
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 161, 162 (1978).
15. Id. at 164 (quoting FREDERICK ELMORE LUMLEY, MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL
215 (1925)).
16. LEVIN & ARLUKE, supra note 6, at 7 (noting that gossip “may describe, but always
in order to make a judgment of praise or of blame”); Donna Eder & Janet Lynne Enke, The
Structure of Gossip: Opportunities and Constraints on Collective Expression Among Adoles
cents, 56 AM. SOC. REV. 494, 494 (1991) (defining gossip as “evaluative talk about a person
who is not present”); Foster, supra note 4, at 83 (summarizing definitions in the literature
as “the exchange of personal information (positive or negative) in an evaluative way (posi
tive or negative) about absent third parties” in a context of congeniality); Nicole H.
Hess & Edward H. Hagen, Psychological Adaptations for Assessing Gossip Veracity, 17
HUM. NATURE 337, 339 (2006) (defining gossip as “a convenient short hand for personal
conversations about reputation relevant behavior”); Laurence Thomas, The Logic of Gossip,
in GOOD GOSSIP, supra note 13, at 47 (noting that factual statements without innuendo do
not constitute gossip).
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Attorney Able: Judge Jones seemed very distracted during the motion session today.
Attorney Baker: Well, he is eligible to take senior status.

In this context, the same factual information about Judge Jones is
now infused with innuendo—perhaps suggesting that his age has affected his focus, or that he is spending time on the bench actively
contemplating retirement. Either way, the information about Judge
Jones is no longer merely descriptive but also evaluative: the tone and
timing of Attorney Baker’s comment suggest a connection (reasonable
or not) between Judge Jones’s behavior in court and his eligibility for
senior status. It is this evaluative dimension that allows gossip to provide an alternative, unofficial, and frequently “more accurate and more
complete” source of data about a person or institution.17
Although gossip has been resistant to a universal definition, consistent with the foregoing discussion I intend to use the term relatively broadly here, simply to mean information about an absent person’s personal qualities or behavior that is communicated in an evaluative way. In this sense, I use “gossip” interchangeably with the
more pedestrian term “evaluative secondhand information.” Because
the attorney-judge relationship is typically a professional work relationship, most frequently this evaluative information relates to a
judge’s professional competence and ideological inclinations. Attorney
gossip of the salacious or malicious type (which judge has a drinking
problem, or a failing marriage, or sexist tendencies), certainly exists,
but it is frankly less useful: personal gossip about a judge is of practical value to lawyers only when it provides clues about the judge’s professional behavior.
Like other forms of information, gossip about judges can be
transmitted verbally, in writing, or even through actions.18 Often it is
shared privately or semi-privately, in response to a direct request
from one attorney to another. Several studies have found that lawyers frequently consult their colleagues for information on judges as
the need arises,19 and lawyers themselves advise asking other counsel about their experiences with a judge.20 Within law firms, formal
and informal logs of encounters with a given judge are routinely

17. Aaron Ben Ze’ev, The Vindication of Gossip, in GOOD GOSSIP, supra note 13, at 11, 23.
18. Deborah Turner, Orally Based Information, 66 J. DOCUMENTATION 370, 371 (2010).
19. Otike, supra note 1, at 32; Margaret Ann Wilkinson, Information Sources Used
by Lawyers in Problem Solving: An Empirical Exploration, 23 LIBR. & INFO. SCI. RES.
257, 266 (2001).
20. Peter R. Bornstein, Persuading a Cold Judge, 35 LITIG. 27, 28 (2009); Bert I.
Huang, Trial by Preview, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1333 n.35 (2013); Thomas A. Mauet,
Bench Trials, 28 LITIG. 13, 14 (2002).
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available.21 Gossip may also be shared more diffusely among attorneys through individual “war stories” in informal social settings.22
Indeed, tales from trial practice, especially those featuring “some foible of a bumbling opposing counsel, a hapless judge, or a pathetic client,”23 are common currency among litigators.24
Public stories about judges are also available.25 These sources include mainstream media coverage of the judge,26 profiles or discussions of the judge in academic or professional publications,27 courtsponsored or court-approved publications identifying individual judges’ preferred practices and protocols, 28 and published ratings and

21. Many firms have implemented case management software that (among other
things) tracks each case within the firm and the assigned judge; this software allows an
attorney in the firm to easily find others who have appeared before the judge. See Daniel J.
Siegel, Case Management in the Cloud, 49 TRIAL 28, 29 (2013).
22. See David C. Brody, Management Note, Judicial Performance Evaluations by
State Governments: Informing the Public While Avoiding the Pitfalls, 21 JUST. SYS. J. 333,
338 (2000).
23. Eileen A. Scallen, Evidence Law as Pragmatic Legal Rhetoric: Reconnecting Legal
Scholarship, Teaching and Ethics, 21 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 813, 816 (2003).
24. The gossip machine runs both ways: judges frequently and admittedly share their
own war stories about lawyers who appear before them. See Hon. Marvin Aspen, The Tenth
Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
146 F.R.D. 205, 229 (1993) (“Just like you [lawyers] in this room have a book on every
judge that you’ve practiced before and you tell war stories about that judge, we judges do
the same thing. When a lawyer is involved in outrageous conduct or unprofessional conduct
before me, when I’m sitting around having lunch with my colleagues, we talk about it. We
don’t keep it a secret.”).
25. “The two major forms of communication typical of gossip are private conversations
and public communication by the media.” Ben Ze’ev, supra note 17, at 16.
26. Some have suggested that media coverage of individual judges leans toward
negative portrayals. See, e.g., Michael W. Manners et al., Balancing Act: Can Judicial
Independence Coexist with Court Accountability?, 41 CT. REV. 44, 48 (2005) (“You can’t
do much about the bad stories about judges. They’re going to always be there, and you
can’t get people, journalists, to do good stories, happy faced stories about you and what
you do every day.”).
27. The Federal Bar Association, for example, runs periodic profiles on federal judges
from around the country and makes those profiles available to its members in its publica
tion, The Federal Lawyer, and on its website. See, e.g., Federal Bar Association, FED. LAW.,
http://www.fedbar.org/magazine.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
28. See, e.g., MCLE NEW ENGLAND, THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT SPEAKS: DISTRICT OF
MASSACHUSETTS (6th ed. 2011) (listing questionnaire responses from federal district and
magistrate judges about their preferred practices). Many court websites similarly identify
“best practices” particular to a court or judge.
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evaluations of the judge, both formal 29 and informal. 30 In the past
decade, these sources have also come to include heavily trafficked
websites devoted to chronicling judicial behavior in and out of court,
tracking everything from “benchslaps” of ill-prepared attorneys to
judges who encounter their own legal trouble.31
Related to judicial gossip is judicial reputation. Judicial reputation is a by-product of stories and judgments by individual attorneys
(and others who have come before the judge);32 it effectively represents aggregated private judgments about the judge’s “vices and virtues, strengths and weaknesses.” 33 Whereas individual war stories
provide specific snapshots of judicial behavior and decision-making,
reputation reflects a more general social judgment about the judge’s
expected future behavior within a distinct legal community: 34 the
lawyers who have appeared—and may appear again—before the
judge in court.35
29. Approximately nineteen states, plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia,
conduct formal judicial performance evaluations for some or all of their judges on a periodic
basis. In most jurisdictions with such programs, written evaluation results are made pub
licly available. See Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial Performance
Evaluations to Promote Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200, 204 05 (2007). Feder
al judicial evaluations have been far more sporadic. One longstanding program is run by
the Chicago Council of Lawyers for its local federal judges. See CHI. COUNCIL OF LAWYERS,
AN EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES IN CHICAGO (2006), available at
http://www.chicagocouncil.org/programs/federal judicial evaluations.
30. Informal rating sites of judges, which allow anyone to leave anonymous comments
on individual judges, have proliferated in recent years. See, e.g., THE ROBING ROOM,
http://www.therobingroom.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); ROBEPROBE, http://www.robe
probe.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2014).
31. See ABOVE THE LAW, http://www.abovethelaw.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2014); see
also UNDERNEATH THEIR ROBES, http://www.underneaththeirrobes.blogs.com (last visited
Nov. 8, 2014).
32. JOHN WHITFIELD, PEOPLE WILL TALK: THE SURPRISING SCIENCE OF REPUTATION
5 (2012).
33. Nicholas Emler, A Social Psychology of Reputation, 1 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL.
171, 178 (1990).
34. WHITFIELD, supra note 32, at 181; Gloria Origgi, A Social Epistemology of Reputa
tion, 26 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 399, 402 (2012); William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice
Liability, and Medical Error, in ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM
167 69 (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004); Nancy A. Welsh, The Reputational Advantages of
Demonstrating Trustworthiness: Using the Reputation Index with Law Students, 28
NEGOTIATION J. 117, 134 (2012).
35. This definition is admittedly more restrictive than those proposed by other com
mentators. Cf. Garoupa & Ginsburg, Judicial Audiences, supra note 9, at 454 (defining
judicial reputation generally as “a mechanism to convey individual and collective infor
mation to the relevant audiences”). It is certainly true that judges must speak simultane
ously to multiple audiences, including lawyers, other judges, current and future litigants,
the media, other branches of government, and the public. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM,
JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2008) (addressing
judicial approaches to each of these groups). The same judge may have somewhat different,
overlapping, and interacting reputations with these various constituencies; the way a dis
trict judge is seen by the Court of Appeals or the local media, for example, may influence
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The sharing of evaluative secondhand information on judges benefits litigators both individually and as a community. As individuals,
attorneys use gossip about a judge to supplement or substitute for
their own direct experience with that judge. This additional information enriches attorneys’ ability to predict the outcomes of future
interactions with a given judge. As a legal community, attorneys use
gossip about judges to acculturate newcomers, enforce informal
norms within the community, and place reputational pressure on
judges to perform their own work fairly, accurately, and efficiently.
The remainder of this Part explores these individual and communal
benefits.
B. Gossip and the Individual Lawyer: Prediction,
Strategy, and Access in Civil Litigation
Litigation strategy is predicated on prediction. The “vast majority
of lawyers” recognize that anticipating likely court outcomes is a core
feature of their professional expertise. 36 One commentator has
deemed the ability to predict outcomes “a major component of the
‘added-value’ ” that attorneys offer. 37 Others have suggested that
“[l]awyers’ judgments of the likelihood of potential outcomes may be
the most important factor underlying clients’ decisions whether to
proceed to trial or pursue settlement, whether or not to drop a case,
and whether or not to invest more time and money in discovery.”38
At its core, prediction in litigation involves anticipating how an
issue would be decided if it were brought to the court for a final decision. This exercise has a straightforward but critical strategic purpose: to determine whether the court should be invited to decide the
issue in the first place. This fundamental strategic consideration
how attorneys perceive that judge as well. However, because attorneys who appear in court
have a special professional relationship with judges, see id. at 98 100, and because those
attorneys who are unfamiliar with a judge are most likely to seek out the judge’s reputa
tion among their peers and colleagues, I limit my reputational discussion to that distinct
legal community. I have explored the perceptions of judges by other audiences elsewhere.
See, e.g., Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation Program for
the Federal Judiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7 (2008) (discussing the general public); Jordan
M. Singer, The Mind of the Judicial Voter, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1443 (2011) (discussing
voters); Hon. William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Com
plete Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 55 (2013) (discuss
ing litigants).
36. Jane Goodman Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict
Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 134 (2010).
37. Mary Helen McNeal, Slow Down, People Breathing: Lawyering, Culture and Place,
18 CLINICAL L. REV. 183, 211 (2011).
38. Craig R. Fox & Richard Birke, Forecasting Trial Outcomes: Lawyers Assign Higher
Probability to Possibilities That Are Described in Greater Detail, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159,
159 (2002).
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arises at every stage of civil litigation. Should a putative plaintiff file
a complaint? Should a defendant file a motion to dismiss? What
claims, defenses, or counterclaims should be raised? Should the
plaintiffs seek class certification, and if so, at what stage? Should a
party bring to the court’s attention a discovery dispute, seek sanctions, or challenge the introduction of evidence or expert testimony?
Should a party seek summary judgment? Should it request a bench
trial over a jury trial? For these types of issues (in which the attorney
has the choice to engage the court in the first instance), prediction
enables a simple, binary calculus: if the anticipated outcome is likely
to benefit the client, the issue should be raised with the court; if the
outcome is likely to not benefit (or worse, harm) the client, the issue
should not be raised with the court.39
Prediction is an equally important strategic tool if an issue has
already been raised by opposing counsel or by the court itself. If the
outcome is predicted to be harmful to the client, the attorney will
work to manage the harm (by, say, conceding certain issues to avoid
the risk of a less desirable judicial interpretation) or will attempt to
remove the issue from the judge’s control altogether (by, say, settling
the case out of court). If the outcome is ambiguous, the attorney will
still structure the presentation of evidence and arguments to achieve
the best possible decision for the client. In any scenario, predicting
what the court is likely to do permits an attorney to organize her
strategies and arguments in specific and beneficial ways.
How can an attorney know what the court is likely to do? Sometimes, the judge will signal the probable outcome in advance. Such
signals may be explicit (such as a “tentative ruling” on a dispositive
motion 40 or a direct statement that one party “has a very strong
39. See Lara K. Kammrath & Abigail A. Scholer, The Cognitive Affective Processing
System, in 5 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 161, 162
(Irving B. Weiner et al. eds., 2012). This is, of course, a bit of an oversimplification. For
example, if several different procedural options each yield a predicted positive outcome, an
attorney might reasonably pursue only the strongest option. Or an attorney might decline
to raise a minor issue with the judge even if she thinks it likely that she will win if the
result would strain her professional credibility with the judge later in the case (say, for
example, if the attorney thinks that she is likely to win a relatively minor discovery dis
pute but knows that the judge generally views discovery disputes as an annoyance and a
waste of time). The larger point here is that the predicted outcome provides an essential
starting point for inviting judicial engagement at every stage of civil litigation.
40. See Alexander J. Konik, Tentative Rulings in California Trial Courts: A Natural
Experiment, 47 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 325 (2014) (discussing the longstanding practice
of issuing tentative rulings on motions in California state courts); Joshua Stein, Tentative
Oral Opinions: Improving Oral Argument Without Spending a Dime, 14 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 159 (2013) (discussing tentative opinion practice in two California
Courts of Appeal); see also Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge,
61 U. KAN. L. REV. 849, 863 (2013) (discussing the practice of “premotion conferences” in
advance of summary judgment in the federal district courts).
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case”41), implicit (such as an unfavorable ruling on a pretrial evidentiary motion, or judicial body language suggesting skepticism about a
particular line of argument),42 or subtle and attenuated (such as terminology in earlier written opinions indicating a willingness to entertain certain types of cases or rule in certain broad directions in the
future). 43 Collectively, these signals provide counsel with valuable
information about the probability of a particular outcome—a preview
of the outcome—which in turn is thought to guide more informed attorney decision-making.44
More often, however, judicial signals are not forthcoming, and a
direct preview of the decision is not possible. Indeed, the very notion
of judicial signaling presupposes a relationship between the judge
and the attorneys in the case. Whether the judge signals directly or
indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally, she is signaling to particular attorneys who are litigating a particular case involving particular legal and factual issues. There are many times in the course of a
case, however, when an attorney cannot afford to wait for a direct
signal from the judge. In these situations, attorneys must substitute
direct previews with virtual ones, by guessing in an educated way
how the judge would decide the issue.

41. E.g., United States v. City of Akron, 794 F. Supp. 2d 782, 804 (N.D. Ohio 2011);
CarboMedics, Inc. v. ATS Med., Inc., No. 06 CV 4601(PJS/JJG), 2008 WL 4323732, at *11
(D. Minn. 2008) (also noting that “[t]he Court fully expects that CarboMedics will prevail
on this issue at trial[]”).
42. See, e.g., Huang, supra note 20, at 1328; Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over
Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 663 64, 688 (2011).
43. See Tonja Jacobi, The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets,
16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2008) (setting out a general theory of signaling); Andrew P. Mor
riss et al., Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 63 (2005) (exploring judicial signaling in opinions related to the federal sentencing
guidelines).
44. In the light of the professed value to litigators of judicial signals, some commenta
tors have taken a normative stance in favor of sharing information on the likely outcome of
the case at even earlier stages. Noting that “[p]arties in litigation provide clear indications
that they desire reliable information about case value,” for example, Geoffrey Miller has
proposed the use of “preliminary judgments” to provide counsel with a judge’s early sense
of the likely outcome of the case. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REV. 165, 204. Together with Samuel Issacharoff, Professor Miller has also proposed
a reformulated motion to dismiss designed to force the parties to reveal pertinent infor
mation on the merits through early stage targeted discovery. Samuel Issacharoff & Geof
frey Miller, An Information Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss, 5 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 437 (2013). Richard Nagareda offered a more general prescription, noting that
“[a] world of vanishing trials invites exploration of whether procedural doctrine might ben
efit from the development of additional pretrial motions that are not dispositive but, ra
ther, informative motions that do not speak to whether trial may occur but seek instead
to inform directly the pricing of claims via settlement.” Nagareda, supra note 42, at 653.
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Such educated guesses are not always easy. The outcomes of judicial decisions are “the products of complex human interactions,”45 and
in anticipating outcomes lawyers must account for a wide range of
potential inputs, including written law, established facts, yet-to-be
established facts, social prejudices, informal legal norms, witness
credibility, the skill of opposing counsel, the complexity and nature of
the story to be told, the parties’ financial and emotional health, and
the proclivities of judge and jury.46 As two commentators have pithily
summarized, “[t]he skilled strategist knows that one can no more
predict the outcome of a case from the facts and the law than one can
predict the outcome of a game of chess from the positions of the pieces and the rules of the game. In either case, one needs to know who is
playing.”47
Knowledge of the interpersonal elements affecting judicial decision-making is not found in books or other written sources. Instead,
such knowledge resides within the heads of individual lawyers—what
Lynn LoPucki and others have described as “mental models” of the
law.48 Mental models eschew the details of the formal, written law in
favor of more simplified, customary understandings of how the law
actually works in practice. As LoPucki explains, “[a] shared mental
model of law implicitly proclaims ‘this is how we do things’ (or, if the
conversation should skip to a higher plane, ‘this is the right thing to
do’).”49 Shared mental models, then, are more a product of personal
experience and attention to interpersonal relationships than rigorous
analytics. The primary difference between experienced and inexperienced litigators is the ability to account adequately for the cognitive,
cultural, and otherwise human elements of litigation.50

45. Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter O. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE
L.J. 1405, 1472 (2000).
46. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Court System Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481, 499
(2009); Marjorie Anne McDiarmid, Lawyer Decision Making: The Problem of Prediction,
1992 WIS. L. REV. 1847, 1882.
47. LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 45, at 1472. Or put slightly differently, does the
attorney fundamentally trust the decision maker to favor his client in the issue presented?
“[T]rust is about positive expectations regarding the other in a risky situation.” T. K.
Das & Bing Sheng Teng, Trust, Control, and Risk in Strategic Alliances: An Integrated
Framework, 22 ORG. STUD. 251, 255 (2001).
48. Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers’ Heads,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1500 (1996).
49. Id. at 1501.
50. See Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Experience, Cognitive Science,
and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 321 22, 355 (1995) (offering a hypo
thetical example); McDiarmid, supra note 46, at 1888 (noting that “neglect[ing] to consider
the attitude of [the] judge . . . is precisely [the] type of mistake that young lawyers and non
lawyers make all the time”).
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LoPucki’s examination of shared mental models focused on substantive law,51 but similar mental models are as prevalent—perhaps
more prevalent—in the realm of adjudicative procedure. Just as litigators create mental models to predict the likely substantive outcome
of a case, they also create mental models of the likely path that the
case will follow and the likely reactions, behaviors, and attitudes of
the key players in the case. The more sophisticated the mental model—the more it accounts for loopholes, idiosyncrasies, and exceptions
to the general rule—the more it will be able to reliably predict the
path of the case and its ultimate outcome.52
The exact process by which people convert disparate information
about another person into a mental model, or impression, of that person remains a rapidly evolving topic within the field of cognitive psychology.53 Indeed, only in the past decade have researchers begun to
account systematically for ways in which people process information
about others in concrete social contexts.54 For purposes of this discussion, however, two important aspects seem relatively clear. First, impression formation is typically an ongoing process: we adjust our perceptions and evaluations of other people at every stage of a relationship, taking into account new information as it becomes available.55
As one set of researchers has explained, “[i]mpressions of others arise
out of direct social interaction, and the interaction patterns themselves affect the impression formation process.” 56 Second, the formation of impressions in a socially situated context typically takes
into account both firsthand (direct) information and secondhand (in-

51. See LoPucki, supra note 48, at 1501 (noting that most of his examples are drawn
from the field of debtor creditor relations).
52. See Blasi, supra note 50, at 321 23 (presenting an illustrative scenario on the rela
tionship between the sophistication of an attorney’s mental model and the sophistication of
the attorney’s ultimate strategy).
53. See C. Neil Macrae & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking Categor
ically about Others, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 93, 113 (2000) (noting that “[r]esearch on the
nature of social cognition has proceeded at . . . an explosive pace”).
54. See Eliot R. Smith & Elizabeth C. Collins, Contextualizing Person Perception: Dis
tributed Social Cognition, 116 PSYCHOL. REV. 343, 343 (2009); Eliot R. Smith & Gün R.
Semin, Situated Social Cognition, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 132 (2007).
55. Aditya Johri, From a Distance: Impression Formation and Impression Accuracy
Among Geographically Distributed Coworkers, 28 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 1997, 1998
(2012); Lara K. Kammrath et al., Keeping Up Impressions: Inferential Rules for Impression
Change Across the Big Five, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 450, 450 (2007); Oscar
Ybarra, When First Impressions Don’t Last: The Role of Isolation and Adaptation Processes
in the Revision of Evaluative Impressions, 19 SOC. COGNITION 491, 514 15 (2001).
56. Thomas Holtgraves & Thomas K. Srull, The Effects of Positive Self Descriptions on
Impressions: General Principles and Individual Differences, 15 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 452, 460 (1989).
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direct) information about a target person. 57 Gossip and other
secondhand information therefore have value both at the very outset
of a relationship (as a substitute for information about a person
gleaned from direct contact) and once the relationship is underway
(as a supplement to information gleaned through direct contact).
Whether used as a substitute or a supplement, gossip allows a litigator to form a coherent mental impression of a judge, through which
the litigator may predict case and event outcomes.
1. Gossip as a Substitute for Direct Interaction
Lawyers often face the prospect of appearing before a judge with
whom they have never directly interacted. Some lawyers are new to
the profession, others new to the legal community. But even the most
experienced litigators will face new judges from time to time, as older
judges retire (or, in some state courts, are voted out) and new judges
replace them. In these situations, a lawyer attempting to predict the
outcome of a case event cannot rely on personal experience in front of
the judge, but nevertheless will attempt to create a mental model of
the judge through secondhand information.
Initial mental models of other people are not drawn on a blank
slate. Rather, in most situations people initially “simplify the task of
understanding others by categorizing them as members of familiar
social groups.” 58 That is, people rely initially on stereotypes. Upon
first learning about a new person, they automatically interpret that
person’s observed or reported behavior to fit within broad character
traits.59 Such categorical thinking is instantaneous and entirely natural. It is also cognitively valuable: as one set of researchers has noted, “[t]he ability to understand new and unique individuals in terms
57. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Collins et al., Integrating Advice and Experience: Learning
and Decision Making with Social and Nonsocial Cues, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 967, 976 (2011).
58. Steven L. Neuberg & Susan T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on Impression For
mation: Outcome Dependency, Accuracy Driven Attention, and Individuating Processes, 53
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 431, 432 (1987). Several leading scholars have suggested
a continuum of impression formation, in which a perceiver may initially form an impres
sion based on categorical assumptions, individuating attributes, or something in between.
Id.; see also Susan T. Fiske et al., Category Based and Attribute Based Reactions to Others:
Some Informational Conditions of Stereotyping and Individuating Processes, 23 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399 (1987). Under this continuum, “people initially catego
rize others, then attend to additional attributes in order to assess the fit of the initial cate
gory (i.e., they judge how typical the person is of the category).” Id. at 403. I therefore focus
first on categorical assumptions here, because the label “judge,” especially in the context of
litigation, will always be initially available to the attorney even when individuating infor
mation on a judge is not.
59. Fiske et al., supra note 58, at 403; Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Person
Memory and Judgment, 96 PSYCHOL. REV. 58, 59 (1989).
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of old and general beliefs is certainly among the handiest tools in the
social perceiver’s kit.”60
How we categorize a new person depends on what we already
know about him. Often, the observer will have already developed
general trait expectations about the target person before learning
any additional personal information about the target. In this case,
the observer will use the expected traits as the basis for his or her
interpretation.61 For example, knowing that a target person is ninety
years old may invoke expectations of physical frailty, or knowing that
a target person is a marathon runner may invoke expectations of
physical fitness. If, on the other hand, the observer has not previously formed any expectations about the target person’s traits, she will
interpret the target’s behaviors in light of whatever applicable trait
concepts come to mind.62 For example, learning that a target person
gave someone an answer on a test may invoke general expectations of
dishonesty or kindness, depending on which trait concept is the most
accessible to the observer.63
These general principles become more concrete when applied to
the litigator-judge relationship. Litigators have natural expectations
about the typical traits of trial judges, among them “impartiality,
fairness, independence, integrity, civility, and professionalism.” 64
That is, a generic trial judge is expected to display both traits of professional morality (patience, lack of bias, fealty to the law) and professional competence (clarity of expression, adequate legal reasoning,
familiarity with applicable rules and standards). These expectations
may have been refined by years of practice, but even before joining
the bar most lawyers develop images of a generic judge from their
law school experience; civics education; personal experience in the
court system as a party, witness, or juror; and encounters with popular culture depictions of the judiciary.65
General expectations of a judge may be further influenced by an
attorney’s beliefs about the court on which the judge sits. For example, if the court has been characterized (fairly or unfairly) by others

60. Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 509 (1991).
61. Srull & Wyer, supra note 59, at 58 59.
62. Id. at 59.
63. See id. at 58 59.
64. Oldfather, supra note 3, at 125.
65. See id. at 127; see also David Ray Papke, The Impact of Popular Culture on Ameri
can Perceptions of the Courts, 82 IND. L.J. 1225 (2007).
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as a “rocket docket,” 66 business-friendly, 67 hostile to civil rights
claims,68 or even a “judicial hellhole,”69 an attorney may presume that
the behavior of an unknown judge on that court conforms to the general culture of the institution.70 Similarly, an attorney’s expectations
about the judges on a particular court may be influenced by the
method of judicial selection for that court, with lifetime appointees
seen as generally more “independent” or “activist” (depending on
one’s politics) and elected judges seen as generally more “responsive”
or “reactionary” (again depending on one’s view).71 Previous experience with other judges on the court may also set attorney expectations
about a new judge: studies have shown that first impressions may be
strongly influenced by one’s attitudes about previously encountered
people who are associated with the target person.72 Finally, attorneys
may have preconceptions about judges based on the expectations derived from the culture of a substantive legal practice. For example,
bankruptcy attorneys may develop categorical expectations about
bankruptcy judges, or divorce attorneys about family law judges.73
66. “Rocket docket” is the term used (sometimes by the courts themselves) to denote
courts in which accelerated pretrial schedules are the norm and extensions of time strongly
disfavored. See Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litiga
tion, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 225, 227 (1997).
67. For more than a decade, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has ranked state courts
by litigation environment, based on perceptions of corporate attorneys. See U.S. CHAMBER
INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2012 STATE LIABILITY SYSTEMS SURVEY: LAWSUIT CLIMATE
RANKING: THE STATES (2012), available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/
files/reports/lr FinalWeb PDF.pdf.
68. See Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights
and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1586 87 (1989).
69. The term “judicial hellhole” has been used by the American Tort Reform Founda
tion to describe state jurisdictions in which “judges . . . systematically apply laws and court
procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner, generally against defendants” in civil
lawsuits. AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2012/13, at 2 (2012), available
at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/ATRA JH12 04.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doctrine of
Article III Duty; or Why the Federal Circuits’ Nonprecedential Status Rules Are (Profound
ly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 955, 967 (2009).
71. These general characterizations are not entirely baseless. Some studies have sug
gested, for example, that certain state courts are friendlier to in state litigants, business
interests, or tort plaintiffs. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan
Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 73 (2011) (finding that every dollar of judicial campaign donations
from business groups is associated with an increase in the likelihood that elected judges
will decide cases for business interests); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Poli
tics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 186 (1999) (finding that
tort awards against out of state defendants in states with partisan elections are approxi
mately $240,000 higher than awards against in state defendants in those same states).
72. See Edward B. Noffsinger et al., The Effect of Associated Persons Upon the For
mation and Modifiability of First Impressions, 120 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 183, 192 (1983).
73. Mary Helen McNeal and Lynn Mather, among others, have made this point with
respect to communities of lawyers in a specific substantive practice. LYNN MATHER ET AL.,
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The categorical expectations that initially shape an attorney’s
mental model of an unknown judge are enhanced, refined, or challenged by judge-specific gossip. Again consider Attorney Able, who is
representing a client in a contract dispute assigned to Judge Jones.
Able has never appeared before Judge Jones, but she has been before
other judges in the same court, and those experiences—together with
her categorical impression of a typical trial judge—have provided her
with a general idea of what Judge Jones may be like. But as a responsible advocate, Attorney Able wants to know more about Judge
Jones before proceeding very far with the case. She independently
contacts two colleagues, Attorneys Baker and Charles, who have recently appeared before Judge Jones in unrelated matters. Baker tells
her that Judge Jones gave him ample time to argue a summary
judgment motion in his recent case and asked pointed and detailed
questions throughout the motion session. Charles tells her that he
has appeared in front of Judge Jones “a couple dozen times” and considers the Judge to be patient and dignified in the courtroom but also
slow to issue orders on motions and not a particularly adept case
manager.
Able will attempt to interpret this additional information in light
of the generic vision of a trial judge that she has already formed.
Charles’s information is purely evaluative (in that it does not describe any specific instance of judicial behavior), so Able will compare
the trait concepts that Charles used to describe Judge Jones (patient,
dignified, slow) with her categorical impressions of a generic trial
judge.74 Baker’s information describes a particular instance of Judge
Jones’s behavior, so Able will try to interpret those described behaviors in terms of a more general trait concept.75 For example, the behavior of allowing counsel ample time to argue the case might be interpreted as patience, and the behavior of asking multiple, pointed
questions might be interpreted as care and thoughtfulness. To the
extent that the described or inferred traits match, they will bolster
Able’s existing evaluative concept of Judge Jones. To the extent they
do not match (if, for example, Baker had reported that Judge Jones
issued his summary judgment order within a week of oral argument,
contrary to Charles’s report that the judge was slow to issue orders
on motions), Able will have more difficulty constructing the evaluaDIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 179 80 (2001);
McNeal, supra note 37, at 216 17. Just as lawyers in a substantive legal community may
reinforce their own expectations about behavioral and practice norms, so too may lawyers
develop and reinforce expectation about judges operating within the same substantive legal
community.
74. See Srull & Wyer, supra note 59, at 59.
75. See id.
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tive concept of Judge Jones, and is liable to seek further information
from additional sources.76 Able will continue to seek information on
Judge Jones until she has formed an evaluatively coherent concept of
him. That concept may ultimately prove to be positive (Judge Jones is
fair, careful, and deliberate) or negative (Judge Jones is slow), but it
must be stable, or Able will continue to seek out further information.
Once an evaluatively coherent impression of a person is formed, it
is sticky, in that it provides foundational assumptions about the other person that are not easily overcome.77 But sticky is not the same as
immovable. First impressions can—and do—change over time in response to new information about a person.78 Therefore, even as Able’s
initial impression of Judge Jones takes shape, she may continue to
seek additional information about him from other lawyers. This is
particularly true if her initial impression of Judge Jones is positive.
Studies have shown that people assign less significance to positive
information about a person than they do negative information and
are more open to reevaluating their impressions of others when those
impressions are initially positive.79 Because the stakes for a client are
so high, litigators are similarly likely to treat positive gossip about a
judge as a cause only for cautious optimism and will seek out more
information to confirm or disprove that initial impression.
What if Able’s initial impression of Judge Jones is negative? Negative first impressions are typically more powerful than positive impressions in ordinary social settings and are harder to overcome.80
Litigation, however, is not an ordinary social setting and litigators
have special incentive to treat any initial impression of a judge—
positive or negative—as only mildly presumptive. For one thing, litigators have a strong reason to form the most accurate impression
possible of the judge, so that predictions of the judge’s behavior and
reactions will carry the greatest value. For another, litigation attorneys are accountable to their clients and colleagues within their
firms and feel natural pressure to justify their predictions and decisions to those parties. Studies have suggested that both the desire for
accuracy and the pressure of accountability reduce the effects of negative first impressions and motivate people to collect further infor76. See id.
77. See Ybarra, supra note 55, at 491 (citing studies).
78. Id. at 514 15; see also Kammrath et al., supra note 55, at 450.
79. See Ybarra, supra note 55, at 492 93 (citing studies). The general explanation for
this behavior is that people with bad qualities still exhibit positive behavior from time to
time (say, a generally dishonest person who sometimes acts honestly), so a positive act is
not dispositive of an overall positive disposition. See id.
80. Id.; see also Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad Is Stronger Than Good, 5 REV. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 323, 323 24 (2001); Jerker Denrell, Why Most People Disapprove of Me: Experi
ence Sampling in Impression Formation, 112 PSYCHOL. REV. 951, 952 (2005).
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mation on others.81 Even a negative first impression, then, likely will
not deter Able from asking for more information on Judge Jones going forward.
Note that Able formed her first impression of Judge Jones without
ever interacting with him directly. Her impression rests instead on
an amalgam of indirect information about the judge: Able’s categorical expectations of trial judges generally, her categorical expectations
of judges within the specific court and legal community, and gossip
specifically about Judge Jones provided by Baker, Charles, and
whatever other sources she ultimately decides to consult. Moreover,
Able’s impression is based on a mere subset of the secondhand information that is available about Judge Jones. First impressions need
not be based on all available information; rather, they are most often
based on the first subset of available information that permits an
evaluatively coherent concept of the target person to be formed.82 In
short, secondhand information may be all that an attorney needs to
form an impression of a judge sufficient to enable a virtual preview of
case outcomes.
2. Gossip as a Supplement to Direct Interaction
It seems intuitive that gossip would be important to an attorney
who has never encountered a judge before. But gossip and other
secondhand information are valuable even to litigators who have enjoyed a long history of sustained interaction with the judge. Although
an indirect source of information, gossip serves as a constant check
on the attorney’s own mental model of the judge. Gossip that aligns
with the attorney’s experience with the judge will serve to confirm
the attorney’s impression of that judge and make the attorney more
confident about predicting the judge’s reactions to the events in his
case. Gossip that cuts against the attorney’s experience will force the
attorney to reevaluate his mental model to some degree and to be
more cautious in his predictions.
To see how gossip affects even the seasoned litigator, it is useful to
first consider how attorney impressions of judges are influenced by
direct encounters. Direct interaction is a powerful source of information. It provides behavioral and contextual evidence of the judge’s
demeanor and propensities—a chance to see the judge in his “natural
habitat,” as it were—and forces an attorney to continually reconsider
81. See Steven L. Neuberg, The Goal of Forming Accurate Impressions During Social
Interactions: Attenuating the Impact of Negative Expectancies, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 374, 384 85, (1989) (discussing accuracy); Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and
the Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 285, 290 (1983) (discussing
accountability).
82. See Srull & Wyer, supra note 59, at 61.
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her preexisting mental model of the judge. Again consider Attorney
Able, whom we last saw preparing for her first court hearing before
Judge Jones. When Able finally does appear before Judge Jones for
the first time, she will interpret his demeanor and behavior in light
of the initial impression she has already formed of him through gossip and categorical expectations.83 If Judge Jones exhibits behavioral
traits that are consistent with Able’s initial impression, she will assume that her impression was correct, and that impression will be
reinforced. If Able sees Judge Jones’s behavior as inconsistent with
her initial impression, however (say, if the judge appeared impatient
or disinterested), a coherent evaluation may be more difficult to construct and Able will feel less confident about what to expect from
Judge Jones in subsequent interactions. She will have to devote more
attention to either confirming or disconfirming her initial impression
by collecting more evidence about Judge Jones.84
Over time, repeated direct interactions with Judge Jones will help
Able adjust her initial impression of his personality and behavior. In
particular, every time Judge Jones’s actions or behavior do not match
Able’s established conception of him, she will pay extra attention to
that information and incorporate it into a new, more refined, impression. 85 This effect, called highlighting, 86 occurs automatically when
conflicting information is presented, even if that information was not
affirmatively sought out.87 Thus, even if Able has developed an impression of Judge Jones as patient and even-tempered on the bench,
she will revise that impression after encountering the judge on a day
when he appears rushed, impatient, or flustered.
The degree to which Able revises her impression of Judge Jones
depends in part on the personality traits that the judge’s behavior
invokes. Certain personality traits are more resistant to impression
change than others. Studies have shown that perceptions of a person’s morality, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and emotional stability are highly volatile, in that even one negative piece of information about the target person’s behavior with respect to these traits
can sully an otherwise positive impression.88 These traits are accordingly said to have high maintenance rates—one must consistently
83. See id. at 59, 61; Tetlock, supra note 81, at 286.
84. See James L. Hilton et al., Attention Allocation and Impression Formation, 17
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 548, 549 (1991); Srull & Wyer, supra note 59, at 59.
85. See Srull & Wyer, supra note 59, at 62.
86. Collins et al., supra note 57, at 969.
87. YUNG KUEI HUANG & LINCHI KWOK, AN ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION SOURCES FOR
TRUST DEVELOPMENT IN MANAGERIAL RELATIONSHIPS (2011).
88. Kammrath et al., supra note 55, at 452 (discussing agreeableness, conscientious
ness, and emotional stability); Ybarra, supra note 55, at 491 (discussing morality).
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demonstrate high levels of positive behavior in these areas in order to
keep a positive impression.89 By contrast, the traits of competence,
openness, and extraversion are far more resistant to change and are
said to have low maintenance rates—a single piece of negative or disconfirming information on these traits is more likely to be seen as an
aberration, such that the perceiver will give the target person the
benefit of the doubt and continue to view the target generally positively.90 As a result, Able’s competence assessment of Judge Jones as
a timely case manager is unlikely to change considerably if the Judge
is slow to act on an isolated motion. By contrast, her morality assessment of Judge Jones as a patient and conscientious jurist is more
likely to be revised downward by a single courtroom appearance in
which the judge appears distracted, annoyed, or distant.
What if Judge Jones’s behavior is perfectly consistent with Able’s
existing impression of him? In social settings, information that is
consistent with preexisting impressions of another person is frequently downplayed and given less attention than inconsistent or
disconfirming information.91 Once again, however, there is good reason to believe that the context of civil litigation is different and that
new confirmatory information is regularly and consciously integrated
into a litigator’s mental model of a judge. For example, research suggests that people seek out and integrate confirmatory information
about a person when they are dependent on that person to achieve a
particular outcome.92 For litigators, outcome-dependency vis-à-vis a
presiding judge is a natural state of being. The judge controls many
outcomes, large and small, throughout the pretrial process. In a similar vein, studies have shown that confirmatory information from a
second-hand source was perceived to be of the highest utility in evaluating another person’s performance. 93 Attorneys therefore should
naturally absorb—and even seek out—gossip about the judge to confirm their existing impressions and bolster their confidence that the
judge will react in an anticipated way.
Direct interaction with the judge, then, plays a significant role in
developing a litigator’s overall impression of the judge’s personality,
demeanor, and disposition toward substantive and procedural arguments. But gossip has an important role to play as well. Just as di89. Kammrath et al., supra note 55, at 451.
90. Id.
91. Collins et al., supra note 57, at 969.
92. Neuberg & Fiske, supra note 58, at 441 42 (discussing own findings and citing
additional studies).
93. See Krista L. Uggerslev & Lorne M. Sulsky, Presentation Modality and Indirect
Performance Information: Effects on Ratings, Reactions, and Memory, 87 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 940, 946 (2002).
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rect judicial behavior that conflicts with an attorney’s impression is
highlighted and used to revise the attorney’s assessment of the judge,
so too are third-party war stories and reputational assessments of
the judge that involve disconfirming information. Thus information
from Attorney Baker that Judge Jones yelled at a lawyer during a
recent hearing will be highlighted and blended into Able’s existing
impression of Judge Jones—even if Able’s impression is based primarily on her own direct interaction with or direct observation of the
judge. 94 Similarly, even if Able’s direct experience suggests that
Judge Jones carefully and thoroughly reads the parties’ briefs before
a motion session, her impression of the Judge’s thoroughness is apt
to change (at least to some degree) upon hearing from Attorney
Charles that Judge Jones has a reputation for quickly skimming
briefs and relying heavily on notes and bench briefs prepared by his
law clerks.
Why would an attorney care about secondhand information on a
judge whom she already knows through a direct relationship? The
short answer is that indirect information, even in the form of gossip,
serves as an important check on what attorneys (indeed, all people)
think they know about others. Indeed, there is a lively and unresolved debate in the cognitive literature about whether accurate
knowledge of another person increases with the length of a relationship. 95 Gossip—which is, after all, someone else’s firsthand information transmitted through a social network96—provides additional
information that acts as a consistency check on our own beliefs about
a person. Consistent secondhand information about a person not only
strengthens impressions of that person developed through direct interaction but also lends the secondhand source greater perceived utility. 97 As long as the information-seeking attorney considers the
transmitted information to be reasonably reliable,98 then, she is likely
94. See Collins et al., supra note 57, at 977; Srull & Wyer, supra note 59, at 62.
95. See, e.g., David A. Kenny et al., Consensus in Interpersonal Perception: Acquaint
ance and the Big Five, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 245, 249 (1994); William B. Swann Jr. & Mi
chael J. Gill, Beliefs, Confidence and the Widows Ademoski: On Knowing What We Know
about Others, in METACOGNITION: COGNITIVE AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 107 08 (Vincent Y.
Yzerbyt et al. eds., 1998).
96. Smith & Collins, supra note 54, at 360 61.
97. Uggerslev & Sulsky, supra note 93, at 945; see also Collins et al., supra note 57, at
977 (finding that indirect and direct information on a person must be integrated, “redun
dant information is learned rather than ignored,” and “mutually supportive information
from different types of sources is treated as confirmatory rather than as redundant”).
98. If the information is not considered reliable, it is more apt to be held in play by the
seeking attorney until other information helps make its meaning clear. See James L. Hil
ton et al., Suspicion and Dispositional Inference, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
501, 505 (1993). Moreover, in some instances, gossip may carry indicia of reliability but in
fact may not be reliable. I address the consequences of reliance on bad gossip in Part III.
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to fold that information into her perspective of the judge, adding
depth and fullness to her overall impression.
C. Gossip and the Community: Attorney Acculturation
and Judicial Quality
So far, we have considered the value of gossip from the point of
view of the individual litigator. But gossip about judges also has value to the larger legal community. One benefit is cultural education.
As a general matter, stories transmitted through gossip may help
acculturate new members to a group by sharing information about
the group’s social norms or indirectly promoting beneficial group values.99 For litigators, gossip about judicial expectations and customs
may serve as a way to indirectly reaffirm the expectations and customs of the local legal community as a whole. Attorneys who are new
to the bar, or who are appearing in court pro hac vice, may be competent to follow written court rules, but will also be expected (perhaps
implicitly) to adopt the informal norms of the local bar. Exchanging
information on presiding judges may help with this process. For example, sharing gossip that a given judge (or court) almost never
grants extensions of time, or becomes visibly irritated with discovery
disputes, or expects parties to negotiate resolutions to pending motions while waiting their turn in morning motion sessions, may cut
down on those types of motions and encourage parties to resolve such
issues on their own.
Gossip also benefits the legal community by establishing expectations about the quality of the local judiciary. Judicial quality matters
to lawyers for a variety of reasons—among them efficient case management, outcome accuracy, and procedural fairness. 100 Using war
stories and reputation to convey morals about judicial activity reinforce those norms within the community. Emphasizing such norms
sends a message to both sitting and aspiring judges about the expectations that the bar has for the bench.101 War stories, reputation, and
cultural norms also allow the bar to influence the selection and retention of judges. Where judges are appointed, lawyers who serve on
nominating committees can draw upon local norms as well as specific
information they have on the lawyers in the community to select top

99. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Gossip as Cultural Learning, 8 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 111,
113 (2004); Foster, supra note 4, at 86; Ralf D. Sommerfeld et al., Gossip as an Alternative
for Direct Observation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 17,435,
17,435 (2007).
100. See Young & Singer, supra note 35, at 57 58.
101. See BAUM, supra note 35, at 99 100.
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candidates. 102 Where judges are elected or re-elected (as in many
state courts), attorneys can draw upon a judge’s reputation—as well
as their own familiarity with the judge—to inform interested voters.103
Assessments of judicial quality also matter to the judges themselves, both as a matter of professional pride104 and (in many jurisdictions) as a gauge of professional respect in advance of reelection, retention, or reappointment decisions. A sitting judge who commands a
strong reputation or individual reviews from the lawyers who appear
before her is more likely to maintain her job at the end of a set
term. 105 By contrast, a judge with a poor professional reputation
among the bar will face a harder road to another term on the
bench.106 Even judges with life tenure face the consequences of judicial quality assessments; though they ordinarily cannot be removed
from the bench, their poor reputations encourage lawyers to avoid
them whenever possible.107
As conscientious professionals, most judges would like to know
what others think of their performance, so that they can build upon
their strengths and improve upon their weaknesses. But judges also
face a very hard time getting good feedback on the jobs they are doing, because no lawyer will dare complain to them directly. This is
particularly true when the cause for complaint is not an evidentiary
or procedural objection, but a personal peccadillo. The judge who appears unprepared, or seems inefficient, or looks not to be paying attention during hearings and trials, will never hear that critique directly from a lawyer in the case.108 Several states have attempted to
compensate for this information vacuum with formal, periodic judicial performance evaluations—programs that combine anonymous
attorney surveys with courtroom observation, peer review, and relat102. See ALBERT M. KALES, UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 238 39
(1914). But see Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial Selection
and Their Application to a Commission Based Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
125, 150 (2007) (suggesting that privileging lawyer expertise on nominating commissions
may be in tension with democratic ideals).
103. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Observations on the Wyoming Experience with
Merit Selection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 281, 318
(1994). But see Stephen L. Wasby, O.T. 1990: The Year of the Judge, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 136,
139 (1992) (arguing that voters are generally unaware of judicial reputation).
104. Karl S. Coplan, Legal Realism, Innate Morality, and the Structural Role of the
Supreme Court in the U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 86 TUL. L. REV. 181, 196 (2011) (dis
cussing judges’ concerns about professional reputation).
105. Stephen Kelson, Judicial Independence and the Blame Game: The Easiest Target
Is a Sitting One, 15 UTAH B.J. 14, 17 (2002).
106. See id.
107. See infra Part III.B.
108. See Young & Singer, supra note 35, at 95.
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ed analyses to provide judges with constructive feedback on their recent performance.109 In other states without formal programs (as well
as the occasional federal jurisdiction), the state or local bar conducts
its own anonymous surveys and shares the information with judges.110 These programs, however, are neither uniformly dispersed nor
of uniform quality. The judge’s general reputation as a jurist, by contrast, is available in every legal community and provides a sort of
backdoor feedback for the judge that is more easily and consistently
available.
In sum, gossip is a necessary, and often healthy, part of civil litigation culture. Evaluative secondhand information both substitutes
for direct interaction with a judge, and supplements that interaction,
allowing attorneys to form the impressions of judges that color their
predictions and related litigation strategies. Gossip even indirectly
reinforces cultural norms. But gossip is also an adulterated information source, prone to error and distortion, with which attorneys
must grapple. It is to these flaws in secondhand information that I
now turn.
III. THE PERILS OF GOSSIP
Gossip about judges can carry a great deal of social and informational value for litigators, but the extent of that value is ultimately
only as good as the quality of the gossip itself. And gossip’s quality is
hardly assured—even when conducted in good faith, the transmission
of secondhand information is naturally prone to a number of cognitive distortions that compromise its accuracy and reliability. This
Part identifies those cognitive distortions and describes the methods
that attorneys use to ensure that the gossip they hear reflects as accurately as possible a judge’s behavior and predilections. Like users
of gossip in other contexts, litigators attempt to confirm the validity
of new secondhand information by comparing that information to
their personal experiences and the relevant experiences of others.
A. Distortion in the Transmission of Information
The transmission of gossip is fraught with potential accuracy and
clarity problems. In any secondhand retelling, both the speaker and
the listener have incentives not to transmit (or capture) the entire
story within its full context. Rather, both parties are selective users
of information. As one set of researchers has explained:
109. For an overview of these programs, see Kourlis & Singer, supra note 29, at 204 05.
110. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SHARED EXPECTATIONS:
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT, at app. A (2006) (discussing unofficial state bar
programs); Kourlis & Singer, supra note 35, at 15 19 (discussing federal pilot programs).
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[I]ndividuals’ interaction partners might not find their perception
of an individual important or interesting enough to pass on to others. And those who receive secondhand information about an individual might not care enough to pay attention to it and retain it
over time. Indeed, receivers of secondhand information listen only
selectively to it, which can lead to a divergence in perceptions between the provider and receiver of the information.111

Put differently, the transmission of information about another person
is colored by the desire of both the teller and the listener for “a good
story.”112 And this desire creates both supply-side and demand-side
inaccuracy.
On the supply side, speakers often emphasize information about
the target person’s actions or behaviors and omit or “downplay information about the context in which [those behaviors] took place.”113
Favoring certain details over others is a natural component of storytelling: “[S]tory construction usually involves stretching evidence to
conform to the contours of a relatively simple skeleton theme. . . . We
must leave out the details that don’t fit, and invent some that make
things work better.”114 The result is a depiction of the target person
that is livelier, sharper, and more memorable, but also lacking in
context and background information.
The selective transmission of information about another person is
often a conscious decision. A speaker may skew information negatively, as when an attorney seeking to make himself the hero of a war
story paints the judge as irrational, incompetent, arbitrary, or
“downright unreasonable.”115 An attorney may relate a story about a
judge who berated counsel for no apparent reason other than his nasty disposition, omitting that the outburst was caused by the attorney’s own lack of preparation, dilatory actions, or disrespect for the
court.116 A speaker may also skew the shared information positively.
111. Cameron Anderson & Aiwa Shirako, Are Individuals’ Reputations Related to Their
History of Behavior?, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320, 321 (2008) (internal cita
tions omitted).
112. THOMAS GILOVICH, HOW WE KNOW WHAT ISN’T SO: THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN
REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 90 (1991) (quotation marks omitted).
113. Thomas Gilovich, Secondhand Information and Social Judgment, 23 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 59, 60 (1987).
114. Ian McGregor & John G. Holmes, How Storytelling Shapes Memory and Impres
sions of Relationship Events Over Time, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 403, 403
(1999) (quoting Roger C. Schank & Robert P. Abelson, Knowledge and Memory: The Real
Story, in 8 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 34 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. ed., 1995)) (quota
tions omitted).
115. Joan Humphrey Lefkow, What Persuades When the Judge Has Discretion?, 31
LITIG. 21, 22 (2004).
116. See Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1232 (2012) (listing
factors that trigger judicial anger at attorneys).
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For example, an attorney may feel loyalty to a judge, developed
through previous personal or professional relationships, gratitude for
earlier decisions, or social connections. Commentators have identified
this fealty as a common phenomenon among a judge’s former clerks,
but other professional groups such as law professors, legal journalists, and fellow judges have also been shown to cast the judges they
admire and socialize with in an unduly positive light. Judges themselves may try to manage their own reputations through these connections, allowing loyal friends and admirers to promote and preserve their positive reputations and challenge or explain away negative perceptions.117
A speaker may also transmit selective information about a third
person unconsciously and instinctively, to suit the listener’s
knowledge and attitudes.118 The social psychologists E. Tory Higgins
and William Rholes have termed this phenomenon the “shared reality” effect.119 They explain:
The communicator is apt to modify the message about the stimulus
person to match the listener’s attitude, for a number of reasons.
One reason is to avoid conflict with the listener. . . . If the stimulus
is evaluatively ambiguous (i.e., both favorable and unfavorable labels can be used to encode it), then the communicator is apt to use
whichever label is evaluatively consistent with the listener’s attitude. For example, if the stimulus person’s behavior can be labeled
as either “confident” or “conceited,” the communicator is apt to label the stimulus person as “confident” when the listener ostensibly
likes this person, but as “conceited” when the listener dislikes this
person. When the stimulus is evaluatively unambiguous (i.e., either only favorable labels or only unfavorable labels can be used to
encode it), then the communicator may omit labeling the stimulus
altogether when its evaluative implications are inconsistent with
the listener’s attitude.120

The desire to achieve “shared reality” with any given audience is
sufficiently strong that a storyteller may change the message of the
story to suit different audiences, even if there is only a brief delay
117. In this area, the bulk of scholarship has focused on Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., whose close relationships both with his law clerks and with like minded ad
mirers at Washington, D.C.’s so called “House of Truth” in the early part of the twentieth
century facilitated his canonization among the most esteemed members of the American
judiciary. I. Scott Messinger, The Judge as Mentor: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and His
Law Clerks, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 119 (1999); Brad Snyder, The House that Built
Holmes, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 661 (2012).
118. See E. Tory Higgins & William S. Rholes, “Saying Is Believing”: Effects of Message
Modification on Memory and Liking for the Person Described, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 363, 363 64 (1978).
119. See generally id.
120. Id. at 364.
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between the storytelling opportunities. One study, for example, found
that storytellers who shared information on a target person with one
audience “significantly modified their messages to suit the attitudinal characteristics of their second audience” after a delay of only fifteen minutes.121 Put in more concrete terms, a lawyer’s description of
a judge to one colleague could differ significantly from that provided
to another colleague on the same day, depending on the perceived
attitudes of the listeners. One can imagine, for example, a junior litigation partner describing an awkward courtroom experience with a
judge in modest and careful terms to a senior partner, but later describing the same experience to a junior associate in a way that
makes the junior partner look heroic and the judge look unreasonable. The reaction of the listener, and the power dynamic between the
speaker and listener, can change the way the story is remembered
and told.
By emphasizing certain characteristics and behaviors of a judge to
achieve “shared reality” with an audience, a lawyer can even influence her own memory of the judge and the event. Over time, as details of her original interaction with the judge fade, the lawyer is
more likely to recall—and rely upon—the characterizations of the
judge that she used most prominently when relaying the story. Thus
even a firsthand encounter can become caricatured over time as it is
shared with others. In psychological terms, “[o]nce a communicator
has labeled a stimulus, the label becomes part of the information recalled about the stimulus, and the stimulus is likely to be reconstructed in recall so as to be consistent with the characteristics of the
category designated by the label.”122
On the demand side, listeners frequently fail to collect all the information available on a target person, selectively listen to the information that is available, and assimilate the information they do
hear into preexisting beliefs about the target person. These distorting
behaviors are entirely natural and in some respects cognitively desirable,123 but they nevertheless compromise the overall accuracy of a
gossip-based impression. One common problem is the failure to accumulate sufficient information on a target judge from secondhand
sources. We previously saw Attorney Able seeking out information on
Judge Jones from several different colleagues, but sometimes a com121. C. Douglas McCann et al., Primacy and Recency in Communication and Self
Persuasion: How Successive Audiences and Multiple Encodings Influence Subsequent Eval
uative Judgments, 9 SOC. COGNITION 47, 61 (1991) (emphasis omitted).
122. Higgins & Rholes, supra note 118, at 364 65.
123. Human beings have a finite and limited capacity to collect and process infor
mation about others; we are “cognitive miser[s].” Emler, supra note 33, at 178 (quotations
omitted).
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prehensive search is impractical: the decision to search for and collect
new information on a judge may be bounded by time and resource
constraints which limit the amount of information the attorney can
acquire. 124 While some case events afford attorneys the luxury to
carefully research the judge before making critical strategic decisions, others do not.125 (Consider, for example, a quickly scheduled
hearing on a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, a
dispute requiring judicial intervention during a deposition, or the use
of a rotating “motions judge” in state court). The danger of limiting
one’s sources, of course, is that the sources that are relied upon may
not fully or accurately reflect the judge’s true disposition or even the
judge’s general reputation in the broader legal community.126
Even if multiple sources are consulted, listeners may not always
take account of all the information they are told. Lack of focus is one
contributor. Lawyers under time pressure, or who face environmental
or intellectual distractions while listening to secondhand information
about a judge, are less likely to process that information thoroughly.127 Even without a heightened cognitive load, however, listeners to
secondhand information typically fail to situate target behavior in
context even when that context is provided.128 That is, even if the storyteller offers a comprehensive account of the activity and circumstances surrounding the judicial behavior, the listener is prone to
tune out many of those details in favor of particular information that
(for whatever reason) he deems most relevant.
What the listener considers relevant may itself be driven by a host
of natural cognitive biases. One of the most common biases is the
primacy effect, whereby the attorney forms an image of the judge
based on the first information he receives about the judge (from
whatever source), and maintains that image of the judge even after

124. Steve W.J. Kozlowski & J. Kevin Ford, Rater Information Acquisition Processes:
Tracing the Effects of Prior Knowledge, Performance Level, Search Constraint, and Memory
Demand, 49 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 282, 285 (1991).
125. One study found that the information seeking behavior of appellate judges is simi
larly affected by time constraints. Otike, supra note 1, at 28 (citing M. M. Hainsworth,
Information Seeking Behavior of Judges of the Florida District Courts of Appeal (1992)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Florida State University)).
126. As one scholar has noted, reputation is best thought of as a “collective phenome
non and a product of social processes, and not as an impression in the head of any single
individual.” Emler, supra note 33, at 171.
127. Robert S. Baron et al., Why Listeners Hear Less Than They Are Told: Attentional
Load and the Teller Listener Extremity Effect, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 826,
836 (1997).
128. Id. at 836 37; see also Mary L. Inman et al., Do We Tell Less Than We Know or
Hear Less Than We Are Told? Exploring the Teller Listener Extremity Effect, 29 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 528, 547 48 (1993).
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subsequent information provides contrary evidence. 129 The primacy
effect is natural and influences human impressions far beyond the
lawyer-judge relationship, but its potential to skew lawyer perceptions of a judge based purely on secondhand information is powerful.
A related cognitive bias is the performance cue effect, by which an
attorney’s expectations about a judge’s decisions and behavior
(drawn, perhaps, from war stories, media coverage, or the judge’s
general reputation) color her assessment of the judge’s actual decisions and behavior. Thus a judge who asks pointed and challenging
questions during a motion hearing may be seen as thoughtful, probing, and “tough but fair” by Attorney A (who had received mostly positive secondhand information on the judge) but rude, unfocused, and
egotistical by Attorney B (who had received primarily negative
secondhand information on the judge). While research into the performance cue effect with respect to attorney ratings of judges has
been relatively limited, the effect has been observed in a variety of
other professions in which observer assessments play an important
role, including higher education,130 professional and amateur athletics,131 and medicine.132
Collectively, the supply-side and demand-side distortions contribute to a larger “extremity effect,” whereby impressions of a third
person “become simpler, sharpened, and polarized” as they are
transmitted between speaker and listener. 133 In this respect, the
transmission of secondhand information about a person is largely indistinguishable from the transmission of a rumor: as it travels, “it
tends to grow shorter, more concise, more easily grasped and told.”134
With each subsequent transmission, background information is eliminated or leveled, and remaining details are sharpened to fit and
promote the leading motif of the story. 135 The result is that a
129. Inman et al., supra note 128, at 547; Tetlock, supra note 81, at 286 (citing studies).
130. See, e.g., Bryan W. Griffin, Instructor Reputation and Student Ratings of Instruc
tion, 26 CONTEMP. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 534, 547 (2001).
131. See, e.g., Leanne C. Findlay & Diane M. Ste Marie, A Reputation Bias in Figure
Skating Judging, 26 J. SPORT & EXERCISE PSYCHOL. 154, 163 64 (2004); David W. Rainey
et al., The Effects of a Pitcher’s Reputation on Umpires’ Calls of Balls and Strikes, 12 J.
SPORTS BEHAV. 139, 146 47 (1989); John K. Scheer & Charles J. Ansorge, Effects of Natu
rally Induced Judges’ Expectations on the Ratings of Physical Performances, 46 RES. Q.
463, 467 68 (1975); R. C. Thelwell et al., Can Reputation Biases Influence the Outcome and
Process of Making Competence Judgments of a Coach?, 23 SCANDINAVIAN J. MED. & SCI.
SPORTS e65, e69 (2013).
132. Sage, supra note 34, at 168 69.
133. Daniel R. Ames & Lara K. Kammrath, When the Dirt Sticks: Negativity in
Secondhand Impressions 3 (Colom. Bus. Sch., Working Paper, 2005); see also Gilovich,
supra note 113, at 60.
134. Gordon W. Allport & Leo Postman, An Analysis of Rumor, 10 PUB. OP. Q. 501, 505
(1946 47).
135. Id.
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secondhand impression of a person is typically much simpler and
“cleaner” than a firsthand impression.136 Such an impression may be
more memorable and vivid, but it also lacks the nuance and situational context that helps explain so many typical human behaviors.
Even if supply-side and demand-side inaccuracy could be avoided,
secondhand information is further prone to staleness. Individual war
stories, courtroom observations of the judge, and even written opinions capture a specific interaction at a specific moment in time. Even
if they accurately reflected the judge’s disposition and personality at
that moment, circumstances can and do change. Judging, like any
profession, has a learning curve. A newly appointed judge with a
purely criminal practice background may need some time to feel comfortable managing civil cases and deciding associated motions. Even
a judge who is familiar with a procedure from practice experience
may be unusually tentative on some matters early in her judicial career. Judges may similarly need some time to feel out their personalities on the bench: How strictly will they address attorneys? How will
they handle scheduling and the use of court staff? What tactics and
behaviors will they use to set the tone of their respective courtrooms?
A lawyer who interacts with a new judge may later find that the
judge’s early actions have changed considerably as she has grown in
judicial experience.
Staleness also affects judicial reputation. What once was thought
to adequately capture a judge’s professional character and personality may not hold up over time. Put another way, “reputations suffer
from neglect” and may diverge from an individual’s actual character
unless constantly replenished with “visible behavioural evidence that
is consistent with the qualities and identities” the individual currently displays.137 Moreover, the problem of a mismatch between reputation and reality extends far beyond the judiciary. As one social psychologist put it, “[w]e all know the disappointing experience of having
trusted the reputation of a famous tourist spot and, once there, wondering what are we were doing in such an awful place. Reputation is
more resilient to time changes than the effective qualities it is supposed to represent.”138
As with individual-centered gossip or war stories, a judge’s general reputation in the legal community is a potentially valuable cognitive shortcut for litigators. 139 If reasonably accurate, it allows a
136. See id.
137. Emler, supra note 33, at 184.
138. Origgi, supra note 34, at 412.
139. See Emler, supra note 33, at 175. Reputation serves as a useful shortcut in social
and professional interactions in large part because it allows us to get the gist of a person’s
predicted behavior without expending significant time and energy.
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lawyer who is unfamiliar with a judge to predict the likely outcome of
a professional encounter as if she did know the judge.140 But the complex social interactions that influence a judge’s reputation also pose
special problems for lawyers who seek to rely on it. First, research
suggests that an individual’s reputation is only mildly related to his
or her history of behavior.141 Individuals who are better known in a
community (for example, a particularly prominent or socially connected judge) may see a stronger link between reputation and behavior but overall the connection is surprisingly low.142 Second, even if a
community of lawyers as a whole has a complete and updated perception of a judge’s reputation, individual lawyers are likely to be missing at least some key information—and it is individual attorneys, not
a community “oracle,” that information-seeking lawyers turn to when
trying to ascertain information on judges. A lawyer consulted about a
judge’s reputation can only offer his or her own perception of that
reputation—a perception that may be clouded by staleness143 or personal affinity or dislike for the judge in question.144
B. Compensating for Distortion
With so many natural cognitive distortions, it may seem incredible
that any information is ever transmitted with a sufficient degree of
accuracy to be useful to the listener. And yet secondhand information
is used every day—by lawyers and everyone else—with reasonable
confidence and typically without ill effects. Lawyers sift through the
gossip and other secondhand information they obtain, considering its
nature and sources, and comparing it to their existing impressions of
a judge. Apparently reliable information is folded into the attorney’s
overall impression of the judge; unreliable information is discounted
or discarded.145
The social psychologist Thomas Gilovich has suggested the following four “helpful guidelines” for evaluating the reliability of
secondhand claims: (1) consider the source of the claims and that
source’s expertise or familiarity with the subject; (2) trust facts and
distrust projections; (3) be cognizant of sharpening and leveling as
140. See Garoupa & Ginsburg, Reputation, supra note 9, at 229; Origgi, supra note 34,
at 416; Welsh, supra note 34, at 134. In this sense, gossip can serve as a viable alternative
for direct observation of the judge. See Sommerfeld et al., supra note 99, at 17, 435.
141. Anderson & Shirako, supra note 111, at 320.
142. Id. at 329.
143. Origgi, supra note 34, at 412.
144. Most judges care about their professional reputations and will work independently
and with supporters to improve or defend their reputations. See supra note 117 and accom
panying text.
145. See Hilton et al., supra note 84, at 548.
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information is relayed; and (4) be wary of the testimonial of a single
person.146 Although these guidelines were addressed to public scrutiny of media reports, they apply equally well to scrutiny of gossip
about judges. In particular, as applied to litigators, all four of Gilovich’s guidelines counsel reliance on sources of information that reflect direct, recent, and preferably repeated interaction with the
judge in question. A lawyer who has enjoyed repeated and recent interaction with a judge is less likely when sharing information on that
judge to project behavioral attributes from a single encounter, less
likely to have stale information, and more likely to appreciate how
judicial behavior and reactions may change in different litigation
contexts.147
Litigation attorneys have many avenues by which to implement
Gilovich’s recommendations. They seek out information from the
most reliable and experienced colleagues they can find. They turn to
multiple colleagues to confirm information. Where time permits, they
arrive at court at least a few minutes early to observe the judge in
action in unrelated cases. They consult reputational and secondary
sources on the judge’s behavior and decisions. They compare others’
war stories against their own personal experience. In short, they look
to sources that are tied as closely as possible to another attorney’s
fresh, direct, and repeated interaction with the judge. The more interaction with a judge a source has had, and the more recent the interaction, the more the source’s assessment of the judge is likely to be
trusted.
IV. THE FUTURE OF GOSSIP IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Given the central role of repeated, direct interaction between attorneys and judges in improving the accuracy and quality of gossip
about judges, both the bench and the bar would be expected to show a
deep interest in growing and maintaining high levels of professional
interaction. But in fact, face-to-face meetings between judges and attorneys in federal district courts are in steady and significant decline.
Moreover, several trends in federal civil litigation are likely to invite
further decline in the coming years. Pressure on attorneys to resolve
cases early in the litigation process (by motion or settlement) reduces
opportunities for lawyer-judge interaction at later stages of litigation.
The use of procedural mechanisms to choose or avoid certain judges
decreases the number of non-voluntary and non-instrumental interactions between attorneys and judges, especially in courts where
146. GILOVICH, supra note 112, at 109 11.
147. Moreover, lawyers who have had repeated direct interactions with the judge are less
likely to have false negative impressions of the judge. See Denrell, supra note 80, at 961.
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judges are not randomly assigned (or where random assignment can
be gamed). Finally, the growth of multijurisdictional civil practice
reduces the number of repeated interactions that a litigator may
have with a judge in his local legal community.
Together, these trends reflect a classic collective action problem
for federal civil litigators. As individual advocates, lawyers act perfectly rationally in avoiding judges with negative reputations by resolving cases early and expanding their practices beyond their local
communities. As a group, however, they would benefit from extensive
interactions with all members of the judiciary: a multitude of regular
interactions should contribute to more robust impressions and judicial reputation, fresher war stories, and the greater availability of
contextualized secondhand information about a judge. Furthermore,
the drop in direct interaction carries significant consequences for litigators as a group: fewer interactions makes it more difficult for attorneys to monitor the accuracy of judicial reputation and other judicial gossip, rendering accessible gossip less reliable and reliable gossip less accessible.
A. The Changing Face of Attorney-Judge Interaction
At least in the federal courts, lawyers and judges are seeing fewer
and fewer opportunities for repeated, face-to-face professional interaction. One prominent reason: the time allocated to courtroom activity is in steady decline. In Fiscal Year 2012 (FY2012) federal district
judges collectively reported spending about 263,000 total hours with
parties in open court or their chambers,148 a drop of nearly nine percent from just four years earlier.149 The year-over-year decline has
been stubbornly persistent since at least Fiscal Year 2008
(FY2008).150
Only about 65,000 of the hours reported in FY2012 were dedicated
to trials and evidentiary hearings in civil cases,151 a yearly average of
107 hours per active federal district judge. 152 Assuming ordinary
workweeks and vacation schedules, 107 hours a year translates to
less than two hours per judge per week in the courtroom on civil trials and evidentiary hearings. An additional 200 or so hours per active
judge per year were reported for “other procedural hours” a catch-all
category that includes conferences and motion hearings for both civil
148. Jordan M. Singer & Hon. William G. Young, Measuring Bench Presence: Federal
District Judges in the Courtroom, 2008 2012, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 243, 258 (2013).
149. Id. (showing that about 287,000 hours were reported in federal district courts in
FY2008).
150. See id.
151. Id. at 259 fig. 1.
152. Id. at 260 tbl. 1.
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and criminal matters.153 Even assuming generously that most of the
“other procedural” hours were taken up with civil matters, actual
face-to-face interactions between the judge and counsel in civil cases
only amounts to about 300 hours per active district judge per year. In
fact it is even less per active district judge, because the reported
hours include time spent by senior and visiting judges as well. Judge
Brock Hornby’s observation that the federal district judge today is
more likely to be poring over documents at her desk than adjudicating cases in open court is, unfortunately, empirically supported.154
This ongoing decline in “bench presence” (as I have termed it
elsewhere)155 means that both judicial decisions and attorney strategies are less likely to be informed by the exchange of ideas and information that typifies a courtroom hearing. More importantly for
purposes of attorney gossip, a decline in bench presence means less
opportunity for repeated, sustained interaction between the bench
and the bar. Indeed, by definition, fewer total courtroom hours must
translate to fewer chances for an attorney to appear before the judge,
less time on average during each appearance, or both.
The causes of the drop in total courtroom time are no doubt complex and multifaceted, but the downward trend is consistent and
unmistakable. Moreover, in recent years the drop in federal bench
presence has proceeded in lockstep with several other trends that
likewise reduce opportunities for direct interaction between civil litigators and federal district judges: the push to resolve cases at an early stage in litigation, the reluctance of attorneys to raise issues or
otherwise interact with a judge who has a poor professional reputation, and the growth of multijurisdictional civil practice.
1. Pressure to Resolve Cases Early
Today’s civil litigators are under pressure to resolve their cases at
the earliest possible stage. At the federal level, roughly twenty percent of civil cases terminate before any court action, and another seventy percent terminate with court action at the pretrial phase, typically on a dispositive motion or by settlement.156 Only about one per153. See id. at 260.
154. See D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2D
453, 462 (2007).
155. See Singer & Young, supra note 148, at 247 (defining “bench presence” as “the
number of hours a federal district judge spends on the bench, presiding over the adjudica
tion of issues in an open forum”); Young & Singer, supra note 35, at 58 (same).
156. Table C 4: U.S. District Courts Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and
Action Taken, During the 12 Month Period Ending March 31, 2013, U.S. CTS., available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStat
istics/2013/tables/C04Mar13.pdf; see also Chris Guthrie, Procedural Justice Research and
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cent of cases actually make it to trial.157 Pretrial resolution is fueled
by a host of considerations, including client concerns about cost and
delay,158 attorney economics,159 the judicial desire to streamline dockets,160 discomfort or inexperience with the intricacies of the trial process,161 and the substantive merits of the case.162 Assisted by relatively recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court decisions, attorneys have responded to these pressures
by using procedural tactics to force a judicial signal on the likely outcome of a case at earlier and earlier stages of the litigation.163
There is nothing inherently wrong with a decision to resolve a
case short of trial, especially if the likely outcome is easily predictable.164 The regular termination of cases before trial, however, does
have consequences for both the quantity and quality of lawyer-judge
interaction. Imagine, for example, that Attorney Able represents a
the Paucity of Trials, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 127, 128 29 (describing the breakdown of federal
civil terminations in FY2000).
157. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Hundred Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years
War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1256 57 (2005); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Exami
nation of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 459, 459 (2004). The trends are similar in state courts; see also LYNN LANGTON &
THOMAS H. COHEN, CIVIL BENCH AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 1 (2009), avail
able at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf; Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining
Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976 2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 762 63 (2004).
158. See, e.g., Paul R. J. Connolly & Saundra Smith, The Litigant’s Perspective on De
lay: Waiting for the Dough, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 274 77 (1983); Daniel W. Shuman, When
Time Does Not Heal: Understanding the Importance of Avoiding Unnecessary Delay in the
Resolution of Tort Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 880, 886 95 (2000).
159. For example, attorneys paid through contingency fees watch their effective hourly
rates plummet as the case moves on: one study found that the mean effective hourly rate
for lawyers working on contingency fell from $589 for cases resolved without any court
action to $141 for cases resolved during or after trial. Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged
Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 791 tbl. 10a (2002).
160. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (decrying
settlement as a “highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets”); Hillel Y. Levin,
Iqbal, Twombly, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 143, 145
(2010) (suggesting that doctrinal changes to both motions to dismiss and summary judg
ment standards were driven in significant part by concerns about docket management).
161. See Tracy Walters McCormack & Christopher John Bodnar, Honesty is the Best
Policy: It’s Time to Disclose Lack of Jury Trial Experience, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155,
165 (2010).
162. See, e.g., Edward Labaton, A View From the Trenches, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 513, 514
(1996) (“The merits are indeed the most critical element in a settlement.”).
163. See Nagareda, supra note 42, at 660 81 (identifying doctrinal developments since
1986 that have steadily pushed merits determinations and related judicial signals to earli
er and earlier stages in litigation).
164. The well known literature on this point circles around the seminal 1984 piece by
Priest and Klein. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Liti
gation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 15 (1984); see also ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 71 76 (2003) (describing the basic economic model
of settlement).
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defendant manufacturer in a small product liability suit. An initial
examination of the allegations and a discussion with the client convinces Able that the case lacks merit, so she decides to file a motion
to dismiss with the court. In conversations with the client, Able concludes that if the motion to dismiss is unsuccessful, the best move is
to try to settle the case for nuisance value. While dismissal is plainly
the preferred outcome, either outcome would end the annoyance of
the case for the client in relatively short order (Able’s reasoning places her in good company; one recent study found that seventeen percent of federal cases in which a motion to dismiss was denied nevertheless settled within thirty days of the court’s ruling).165 This strategy may be a good one for the client and for the specific case, but it
comes at a cost: Able’s only direct interaction with the presiding
judge in the case is likely to come at a hearing on the motion to dismiss. Moreover, because Able’s interaction with the judge will come
so early in the case, she will have only a thin expectation of how the
judge might behave in later stages of litigation. The weakness of that
impression will have no bearing on the instant case, but it will render
Able at least marginally less familiar with the judge, and thus marginally less effective, the next time she appears before him. Moreover, her value to other lawyers as a source of gossip about the judge
is also at least marginally less effective as a result of the early case
termination: a colleague trying to get a good handle on what the
judge is like might be confident in Able’s description of his handling
of the motion to dismiss, but far less confident in extrapolating that
description to the discovery, summary judgment, or trial phases.
The lost opportunity for Able to collect more evidence about the
judge through direct interaction is unlikely to merit any real consideration in her overall decisional calculus for the case before her. Indeed, no lawyer would tell a client that she needs to prolong the case
to learn more about the judge for the benefit of future interactions,
especially on the client’s dime. But when such decisions are multiplied by hundreds of thousands of cases every year, the marginal effect becomes substantial. Early case resolution, no matter its immediate and particularized benefits, robs lawyers of opportunities to
know judges better, which in turn leads to less robust mental models
of judges, weaker predictions, and less confidence in other attorneys’
secondhand information.

165. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL
THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A 21ST CENTURY ANALYSIS 7 (2009).
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2. Experience Sampling and Judge-Shopping
As a group, lawyers would benefit from more interactions with
judges, since additional opportunities to observe a judge’s behavior
are more likely to improve the overall accuracy of the community’s
evaluation of the judge.166 At the same time, no individual attorney
wants to appear before a judge whose actions or decisions are predicted to provide a bad outcome for the client.167 Typically, the interests of the client win out over those of the bar. If an attorney has had
a bad experience with a judge, or has heard that others have had bad
experiences, the attorney will try to avoid future interactions with
that judge, either by seeking another forum or by preventing issues
from being placed before the judge for decision.
Lawyers have at their disposal a variety of formal and informal
procedures to sidestep judges whom they believe to be undesirable.
Plaintiffs with several venue options can steer away from courts with
judges thought to be unfriendly, and toward courts with more sympathetic jurists.168 In some circumstances—most notably in bankruptcy
and patent cases—the reputation of a court or even a particular judge
has led to repeated and unmistakable forum-shopping.169 In another
well-known tactic, attorneys try to game the assignment process by
waiting outside the clerk’s office until a desired judge is next in line
for a new case.170 Once a case is filed, defendants may attempt to
change the judge through transfer, disqualification, or (if originally
in state court) removal.171 Plaintiffs and defendants are also increasingly turning to arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute
resolution, giving them much greater control over the identity of the
166. See Denrell, supra note 80, at 953.
167. See id. at 952.
168. See Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Se
lecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 80 (1999); Gita F. Rothschild, Forum Shopping, 24
LITIG. 40, 42 (1998).
169. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Em
pirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
967, 984 (1999) (discussing bankruptcy filings in the Southern District of New York in the
1980s); Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation,
9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 202 (2007) (discussing patent filings); Robert K. Rasmus
sen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corpo
rations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1392 93 (2000) (discussing bankruptcy filings in Delaware
in the 1990s).
170. See Weyman I. Lundquist, The New Art of Forum Shopping, 11 LITIG. 21, 22
(1985); Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on
Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 296 (1996).
171. Such practices are risky and require follow up investigation: if a motion to trans
fer, remove, or disqualify is successful, what is the risk that the replacement judge will be
even less desirable? See James J. Ferrelli, Why or Why Not Federal Court? (Be Careful
What You Ask For), N.J. LAWYER, Feb. 2004, at 6 7.
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decision-maker and effectively allowing them to pick their own private judges.172
Even when forum shopping is not possible or practical, the initial
belief that a judge is likely to be unsympathetic to a party’s position
has real-world consequences. In the most extreme scenario, a putative plaintiff with a potentially meritorious claim may choose to forgo
filing a lawsuit altogether, reasoning that the high risk of an unfriendly judge coupled with the high cost of prosecuting the case is
simply not worth the time, energy, expense, or humiliation.173 Alternatively, the plaintiff may file the case but leave out complex or novel
claims—notwithstanding their merit—for fear of confusing or annoying the judge.174 The defendant may do the same for novel or complex
defenses. In less extreme scenarios, a party may choose to maintain
the case in front of the judge but not raise certain issues during the
pendency of the litigation—for example, by declining to file a motion
to compel discovery if the judge is thought to be hostile to discovery
disputes. On the other hand, a party may use cost, delay, or extralegal strategies to pressure the other side into settling the case before
the judge is directly faced with resolving the substantive issues.175
These consequences of such avoidance strategies are difficult or impossible to track empirically, but the anecdotal evidence of such behavior is strong.
The desire to avoid certain judges, and gravitation toward others,
is known as experience sampling and is common in a wide variety of
social and professional settings.176 Like most people, lawyers naturally base future interactions with others on past impressions.177 Such
decisions may be quite rational—after all, the litigator wants to maximize the client’s chance of winning. But experience sampling also
makes it less likely that the judge will be able to correct a false negative impression: if a lawyer already thinks poorly of a judge, and is
able to avoid that judge in the future, there will be no countervailing
opportunities for the judge to demonstrate that the lawyer’s impression is incorrect.178
The risk of selection bias resulting from experience sampling is
especially high for new trial judges, most of whom lack prior judicial
experience and many of whom can claim relative expertise only in
172. Carrie Menkel Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1889, 1900 (1997).
173. See Steven Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 11, 15 (2001).
174. See id.
175. LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 45, at 1457 61.
176. See Denrell, supra note 80, at 951 52.
177. See id. at 953.
178. See id. at 951.
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certain areas of criminal or civil law before ascending to the bench.179
There is a steep learning curve associated with being a new judge,
not just in quickly gaining familiarity with a wide range of rules and
substantive doctrine, but also in finding one’s voice and temperament
on the bench. New judges may initially adopt a judicial style that is
too harsh or too lenient for their respective personalities, and require
some time to settle into their new public personae. A new judge’s initial docket is also frequently composed of cases cast off by more experienced judges, which may involve complex facts or law, quarrelsome
parties, or long-pending motions.180 A new judge, then, must make her
early reputation under highly challenging circumstances. If the judge
succeeds, she will gain a strong reputation and will be sought out by
attorneys going forward. But if her first year on the bench reflects relative delay, incompleteness, or harsh temperament, the resulting negative reputation may prove hard to overcome even if the judge’s efficiency and demeanor change markedly in subsequent years.
One bulwark against experience sampling is to make it difficult or
impossible for attorneys to select certain judges. “If individuals cannot voluntarily choose their future interaction partners . . . impressions based on previous interactions cannot influence the probability
of future interactions.” 181 Moreover, “a higher probability of nonvoluntary or noninstrumental interactions implies a higher average
evaluation” of judges.182 To this end, most federal district courts have
implemented random assignment systems to prevent egregious
judge-shopping by lawyers and parties.183 But as noted above, random assignment systems can be overcome or manipulated.
At bottom, the individual interest of attorneys to avoid a particular judge in a particular case outweighs the collective interest of attorneys to increase the level of direct interaction between bench and
bar. Although a greater number of interactions in a greater number
of settings are more likely to increase the accuracy of lawyers’ impressions of judges, no lawyer is willing to sacrifice his client’s posi179. See, e.g., Hon. Mary Vasaly, Training the New Judge, 68 BENCH & B. MINN. 26 (2011).
180. See, e.g., Comm. on the Fed. Courts of the Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y.C., Article of
Special Interest Report Evaluating the Individual Assignment System in the Southern Dis
trict of New York After Three Years’ Experience, 69 F.R.D. 497, 506 (1976).
181. Denrell, supra note 80, at 953.
182. Id. at 956.
183. Frequently Asked Questions: Federal Judges, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/
Common/FAQS.aspx (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (noting that “[t]he majority of [federal dis
trict] courts use some variation of a random drawing” to assign new cases). Interestingly,
some courts have undermined their own random assignment systems by allowing judges to
accept later filed “related” cases or by declining to preside over certain types of cases.
Katherine A. Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the Southern
District of New York’s “Related Cases” Rule Shaped Stop and Frisk Rulings, 19 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 199, 203 (2014).
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tion in a given case for the collective good of the bar. The result is
that lawyers who are assigned to judges of whom they have poor impressions are more likely to settle the case quickly, move the case to
another venue, or turn to private dispute resolution. In any event,
the bar’s ability to learn from more interactions with the bench is
compromised.
3. The Growth of Multijurisdictional Litigation
Finally, there are declining opportunities for lawyers and judges
to engage with each other repeatedly across a variety of cases. Like
any relationship, judge-lawyer relationships are made more nuanced
and robust through repeated interactions. A single encounter over,
say, a motion to dismiss may not provide a very good template for
predicting each side’s expectations and level of preparation on future
motions to dismiss. That same encounter may be even less useful in
predicting each side’s expectations on different procedures such as
discovery motions or evidentiary hearings. Lawyers who see the same
judge in different settings can better anticipate the things that the
judge will find important, and structure their evidence and arguments accordingly. Put slightly differently, “[t]he sophisticated, wellresourced, or repeat player—that is, the ‘insider’—may be expected to
have an advantage when it comes to anticipating what it means to
have a certain judge in the case.”184
Because criminal law is more localized, prosecutors (and perhaps
to a slightly lesser extent criminal defense lawyers) regularly appear
in front of the same judges and can better appreciate each judge’s
rhythms, interests, and quirks.185 So, too, may civil litigators in specialized state courts come to know their local judges by virtue of regular practice there. And certainly the same is true for some federal civil litigators, especially those whose practice involves local clients and
repeated filings in the same court. But federal civil litigation in particular is also more prone to the challenges of multijurisdictional
practice. Increasingly, lawyers in private practice are called upon to
184. Huang, supra note 20, at 1363.
185. As one set of scholars notes, a criminal case is typically processed by an intimate
“courtroom workgroup” consisting of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, court clerks,
and bailiffs who work together and feed off of each other in processing a criminal
charge; as a result, a criminal defendant “confronts an organized network of relationships,
in which each person who acts on his case is reacting to or anticipating the actions of oth
ers.” JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 10 (1991); see also PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR
OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 39 41 (1988) (introducing
the idea of the “courthouse community” in local criminal law, which “includes not only
those actors who regularly interact with one another in the disposition of criminal cases,
but also the structure of communication patterns among the actors”).
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travel to and represent their clients in jurisdictions in which they do
not regularly practice and may not even be admitted to practice.186
Lead counsel in a case is more likely to not be from the same legal
community as the judge.187 Even though state and federal courts typically require attorneys appearing before them to have bar admission
or be accompanied by a local counsel of record if admitted pro hac
vice,188 an out-of-town attorney is likely to have a lower level of familiarity with the judge than if that attorney had been in regular practice in the jurisdiction. Attorneys with national clientele may be
highly competent and highly experienced, but they are at a natural
disadvantage walking into a courtroom in which the presiding judge
is completely or relatively unknown. While it is impossible to quantify, there are surely thousands of e-mails and phone calls exchanged
between attorneys each year to the effect of “what do you know about
Judge X?”189
Opportunities for judge-lawyer interaction are increasingly limited not only across cases but also within them. Part of this is due to
the way that federal pretrial litigation is currently structured. Federal district courts use an individual calendaring system which typically keeps a case in front of a single district judge,190 but even then
magistrate judges and special masters frequently handle the bulk of
discovery disputes and occasionally other non-dispositive motions.
While this approach may (or may not) be more efficient for the courts
and parties, one effect of this division of labor is that attorneys have
less interaction with the district judge before they raise substantive
legal or evidentiary issues with the court.
186. See Robert A. Creamer & Thomas P. Luning, An Introduction to the New Illinois
Rules of Professional Conduct, 17 CBA REC. 25, 27 (2003) (noting that “the work of the
ABA’s Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice showed that a growing number of law
yers regularly represent clients in connection with transactions and litigation that take
place in jurisdictions where the lawyers may not be admitted”); see also Randall S. Thomas,
What Should We Do About Multijurisdictional Litigation in M&A Deals?, 66 VAND. L. REV.
1925, 1935 (2013) (noting that multijurisdictional litigation in the M&A field “has
grown . . . dramatically in recent years”).
187. See, e.g., EDWARD P. WELCH & SARAH RUNNELLS MARTIN, MULTI JURISDICTIONAL
LITIGATION: SOME PRACTICAL THOUGHTS AND SOLUTIONS 1 (2012), available at
http://www.skadden.com/insights/multi jurisdictional litigation some practical thoughts and
solutions.
188. See Clint Eubanks, Can I Conduct This Case in Another State? A Survey of State
Pro Hac Vice Admission, 28 J. LEGAL PROF. 145, 148 50 (2004).
189. See Mauet, supra note 20, at 14 (recommending, in the context of “know[ing] your
judge,” that attorneys “[a]sk other members of your firm and lawyer friends about their
experiences with the judge in your kind of case”).
190. By contrast, many state courts employ a central assignment or “master calendar”
system in which rotate judges through divisions, meaning that many different judges may
handle motions or conferences related to a single case. Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles
of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1053 (1995).
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B. The Commodification of Gossip
The trends described above do not mean that attorney-judge interaction in the federal district courts will drop to zero or that the
robust courtroom practice that many attorneys do experience will
necessarily dwindle. But they do suggest that personal knowledge
gained from repeated direct interaction with judges will become increasingly concentrated in the hands of a smaller cluster of active
local litigators. That is, there will be many civil litigators who have
little or no face-to-face dealings with judges and a handful of civil litigators who know the judges and their courts very well. For both
groups, gossip about judges is apt to become a more valuable commodity: those without direct knowledge will rely more heavily on gossip in the increasingly rare circumstances they do face a judge, and
those with extensive direct knowledge will find that their experiences
and insight are valued in the marketplace. This eventual commodification of gossip about judges suggests two additional consequences:
the gossip that remains accessible in the wider legal community will
be less complete and less reliable, and the gossip that reliably and
accurately reflects the judge’s tendencies will be less accessible to all
but a small, elite group of litigators.
1. Accessible Gossip Will Become Less Reliable
As discussed in Part III, the transmission of gossip is prone to a
number of cognitive distortions. Since accurate impressions of judges
are so important to litigators’ predictive work, attorneys compensate
for these distortions by seeking out information from multiple
secondhand sources and giving preferential treatment to sources that
reflect direct, recent, and preferably repeated interaction with the
judge in question. In particular, regular, direct interaction between
the bench and bar enhances the reliability of secondhand information
about judges by combating staleness, providing points of comparison
for individual war stories, and generally providing additional context
to help confirm or disconfirm an attorney’s developing impression of
the judge. Direct interaction also lessens the power of the extremity
effect: while any given story becomes sharper and more polarized
with each retelling, a multitude of stories about the same judge enables a thoughtful listener to reconcile inconsistencies and develop a
more nuanced impression of the judge.
A decline in direct interaction between judges and lawyers undoes
much of this important reconciliatory work. Fewer face-to-face meetings between judges and lawyers translates to fewer new evaluative
moments and fewer fresh waves of secondhand information. The gossip that remains is increasingly stale; even if both teller and listener
attempt to place the judge’s action in context, that context is dated
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and is less certain to reflect the judge’s current practices and proclivities. Fewer waves of new information also prolong the lifespan of
stale gossip, as attorneys seeking additional information turn to older
stories about the judge to confirm or disconfirm their impressions.
Every new retelling of older gossip, however, contributes to the extremity effect, with the recalled (and retold) information becoming
sharper, more decontextualized, and typically more negative with
each repetition.191 Even if attorneys continue their efforts to seek out
multiple sources of information on a judge when forming their impressions, the quality of the available information will be degraded
by the collective decline in attorney-judge interaction.
A drop in direct interaction between judges and lawyers carries
another consequence for the validity of secondhand information: a
decline in social connectedness between bench and bar. Studies have
shown that secondhand information (particularly in its reputational
form) more accurately reflects a person’s behavioral history when
there is a high level of social connectedness within the relevant community. 192 As firsthand interactions between attorneys and judges
decline, so does the social connectedness between bench and bar. The
result is judicial reputations that are further removed from actual
judicial behavior and more susceptible to the leveling and sharpening
effects that already characterize secondhand information. Put another way, when direct interaction is absent, the sensational aspects of
secondhand stories take on greater prominence and overall accuracy
suffers. More extreme perceptions of a judge may lead to more decisions to forgo bringing cases or motions before that judge, further
limiting interaction opportunities and creating a vicious circle of distorted beliefs.
Finally, and relatedly, a decline in bench-bar interaction compromises the vitality of the legal community’s collective values.
Stale or attenuated information on encounters with judges hinders
the healthy acculturation of new attorneys in the community and
may also establish inaccurate or unrealistic expectations of the
judges in that community. If judges’ reputations are grounded in
stale encounters and ossified expectations, both litigators and judges may be disappointed.

191. See generally AMES & KAMMRATH, supra note 133, at 20 21 (noting negativity and
transmission effects of secondhand retellings); Inman et al., supra note 128, at 547 (noting
tendency of listeners to rate target person more negatively than tellers).
192. See Cameron Anderson & Aiwa Shirako, The Origins of Reputation: Behavior,
Visibility, and Personality 35 36 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t, Working Paper
No. 153 07, 2007); see also Cameron Anderson & Gavin J. Kilduff, The Pursuit of Status in
Social Groups, 18 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 295, 297 (2009).
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2. Reliable Gossip Will Become Less Accessible
Accurate mental models rely on direct interaction and gossip
working in tandem. Repeated interaction is key, which is why the
most robust mental models in legal communities are often associated
with high levels of direct interaction and a close-knit gossip community. Indeed, it has been suggested that repetition of interaction contributes to the emergence of local legal cultures and has “a profound
impact on their strength.”193 Attorneys who operate in courts and legal communities where direct interaction and repetition are possible
carry an advantage when it comes to understanding how those courts
and individual judges operate.194
For some lawyers with a significant federal civil practice, that advantage is likely to be significant enough to buck the general trends
away from regular attorney-judge interaction. For these lawyers,
regular interaction remains a highly valuable strategic resource.
They are able to form more complete impressions of each judge and
his or her inclinations and behaviors, which enhances their ability to
predict outcomes and judicial responses. Moreover, as this specialized
knowledge becomes more limited, it becomes more valuable in the
marketplace. Clients who anticipate going to trial—or even hanging
their cases on a dispositive motion—will highly value lawyers who
hold the metaphorical keys to the judge’s thought processes. Accurate
and thorough impressions of judges, in other words, will be an increasingly rare and valuable commodity. Lawyers with this specialized knowledge accordingly will be less inclined to share it (in the
form of gossip) with other lawyers or similar interested parties.
When it is shared, it will be shared at a price.
The commodification of gossip poses important access to justice
issues. Parties who cannot afford or otherwise gain access to a lawyer
who is a judicial “insider” will often be at a comparative disadvantage. Indeed, at the extremes it threatens to create two classes of
lawyers, roughly akin to the British system of solicitors and barristers—one group of lawyers will take cases in the expectation of resolving them well before trial, and a small group with specialized
knowledge of judges will take cases in the expectation of resolving
them in court.
Even without an extreme scenario, however, something important
is lost when fewer attorneys have a strong sense of their local federal
judges. Gossip stops being a meaningful supplement to attorneyjudge interaction and increasingly becomes purely a substitute for
that interaction. Strategic litigation decisions are based less on direct
193. See McNeal, supra note 37, at 211.
194. Id. at 216 17.
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experience, and more on reputation and rumor. For attorneys, this
state of affairs makes prediction more difficult and resulting strategies at least marginally less effective. For judges, it threatens to
make reputations and rumors about judicial behavior sharper and
more negative than reality reflects.
V. TOWARD BETTER GOSSIP
The trends that pull federal civil litigators away from regular, repeated courtroom interaction with judges are unlikely to ebb anytime
soon. Early case resolution, multijurisdictional practice, and selective
judicial avoidance each make sense from the strategic perspective of
an individual case or client. Moreover, as these practices become
more commonplace, they also become more entrenched. The current
generation of young attorneys is increasingly comfortable with defining themselves as “litigators” rather than “trial lawyers”—with relative expertise in handling written briefing, discovery, and settlement,
and relative non-expertise in oral argument, evidentiary objections,
and trial techniques. As attorneys grow more comfortable with the
court playing only a peripheral role in the actual resolution of disputes, the need to appear before a judge will seem less and less necessary. For some judges as well, a drop in interaction with attorneys
may not be viewed as a bad thing—fewer hours spent listening to
discovery disputes or hearing a lawyer simply rehash his brief at oral
argument means more hours available to resolve motions or write
opinions and orders in chambers.
Still, lawyers and judges should be deeply concerned about the
continuing drop in professional interaction between bench and bar.
For attorneys, a drop in interactions with judges means fewer opportunities for a judge to signal likely outcomes, fewer chances to build
impressions of judicial demeanor and behavior based on personal observation, greater reliance on the observations and evaluations of
others, and less confidence in predictions involving discrete case
events. For judges, a drop in interactions with attorneys means fewer
opportunities to showcase typical management and jurisprudential
approaches, fewer chances to signal possible outcomes and preferences to counsel, and greater risk that one’s own reputational legacy
is caricatured by natural operation of the extremity effect. Both lawyers and judges, then, have much to gain by maintaining a strong
level of direct interaction—interaction that contributes to a healthy
flow of fresh, contextualized secondhand information. The remainder
of this Part begins to briefly sketch out some steps—some simple,
some more intensive—to restore a healthy level of direct interaction
and prevent the degradation of the quality and availability of
secondhand information.
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A. Strategies for Judges
The extremity effect poses a particular challenge to the legitimacy
of courts and individual judges. A negative judicial reputation not
only influences attorneys, but also policymakers and the general public. A state judge who (fairly or unfairly) develops a reputation as biased, ideologically driven, incoherent, or unprofessional will find it
more difficult to be reelected or reappointed to the bench.195 A federal
judge with the same reputation faces no risk of electoral retribution
but may be less likely to be promoted within the judiciary.196 Controlling one’s own professional reputation is notoriously difficult.
But trial judges in particular have an easy mechanism for increasing direct interaction with attorneys and avoiding the most substantial risks of polarized reputations—encouraging more live hearings
and trials.197 It certainly can be done. Notwithstanding the national
decline in both total courtroom hours and hours devoted to civil matters, several federal districts were able to raise their own hours in
these areas between 2008 and 2012.198 Even telephone and videoconferences provide some form of direct conversation between judges and
attorneys and provide a regular source of fresh information by which
attorneys can develop their impressions of the judge.199 Nor is there
any strong empirical evidence that deciding issues at or following a
hearing is less efficient than deciding those issues on the papers; indeed, some studies have suggested that hearings are associated with
the faster disposition of both discovery and dispositive motions.200 By
scheduling and encouraging more proceedings in the courtroom,
judges provide countless additional opportunities for lawyers to interact with and observe them (and vice versa), all without provoking
a decline in the judge’s administrative efficiency.
195. See Singer, supra note 35, at 1459.
196. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 7 (1993).
197. From FY2008 to FY2012, for example, the Eastern District of California and East
ern District of New York averaged more than 700 hours per active judge per year in the
courtroom, upward of 150% of the national average. Singer & Young, supra note 148, at
262, tbls. 1 2.
198. A comparison of the relevant internal Administrative Office statistics shows that
10 of the 94 federal districts raised their overall courtroom time by at least 20% in FY2012
over FY2008, and 26 of the 94 districts raised their civil trial hours by at least 20% in the
same period. Compare Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Table R 11, Total Hours
Activity Report for the 12 Month Period ending Sep. 30, 2008 (on file with author), with
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Table T 8, Total Hours Activity Report for the 12
Month Period ending Sep. 30, 2012 (on file with author).
199. See Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 40, at 861; see also Steven S. Gensler & Lee
H. Rosenthal, Measuring the Quality of Judging: It All Adds Up to One, 48 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 475, 486 90 (2014).
200. See Singer & Young, supra note 148, at 271 76.
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Judges should also consider videotaping a representative sampling of hearings and trials and posting those videos on their court
website for attorneys to access. This approach—already underway as
part of a voluntary pilot program in fourteen federal district courts—
permits attorneys who have not already interacted with the judge to
observe the judge’s adjudicative style directly from any location at
any time.201 Alternatively, judges might work with the bar to develop
a formal database of hearing and trial transcripts, thereby allowing
attorneys to search for and review each judge’s approach to pretrial
procedures, evidentiary questions, and substantive legal issues. Databases of videos and transcripts effectively create a “Judges on Demand”202 library that can serve as educational and interpersonal tools
for lawyers who are new to the judge’s courtroom.
B. Strategies for Lawyers
Some attorneys may jump at opportunities for more direct interaction with judges and would be easily amenable to judges encouraging
more live proceedings. But even those litigators who dislike courtroom interaction, or who favor it in principle but are constrained by
the pressures for early resolution to avoid it in practice, should be
incentivized to improve the quality of secondhand information about
judges that is shared within the legal community. That is, lawyers
should be made aware of the natural cognitive biases that affect the
transmission of secondhand information, and should embrace personal accountability for transmitting and receiving that information
as completely and fairly as practicable.
As noted in Part III, litigators already have a heightened incentive
to process secondhand information on judges carefully. Relying on
one or two sources, especially those of questionable reliability, might
lead to an inaccurate impression of the judge and an inaccurate prediction of the judge’s likely response. But that heightened incentive is
largely the result of intuition; most lawyers are presumably unaware
of the specific nature of the extremity effect, the “shared reality” effect, or the propensity of both speaker and listener to omit contextual
details. Educating lawyers about these specific cognitive biases might
further encourage them to collect as much information as possible on
a judge before engaging in predictions—especially if the preliminary
information gathered leads to a negative first impression. Under201. See Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Manage
ment Guidelines for the Cameras Pilot Project in the District Courts, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2011/docs/CamerasGuidelines.pdf (last visited Nov.
8, 2014). Videos from the pilot are available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Multimedia/
cameras.aspx.
202. I am indebted to Judge William Young for this phrase.
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standing the nature of cognitive bias would also benefit attorneys as
information presenters; while no transmission of secondhand information would perfectly capture the reality of a direct experience with
the judge, heightening awareness of the natural biases inherent in
transmission may provide further incentives for lawyers to share information as completely and fairly as they know how.
Of course, even perfect awareness of transmission bias will not
alleviate all distortion in judicial gossip. Cognitive limitations and
human emotion will always come into play. A lawyer who received a
verbal “benchslap” from an angry judge may never share that experience with colleagues, or if it is shared the lawyer is unlikely to divulge that his own behavior, language, or unpreparedness sparked
the judge’s response. Moreover, people are naturally social beings
and storytellers—litigators all the more so. A good story never provides full and even-handed context; it highlights the most interesting
and controversial parts. But even if heightened awareness of transmission bias leads to marginally heightened accountability among all
lawyers in a community, secondhand information about judges will
be better for it.
Moreover, where judges do not receive public evaluations, lawyers
might want to periodically conduct their own judicial evaluations as a
means of formally and transparently assembling their collective
knowledge and experience with the local judiciary. Many local and
state bars have polled their members from time to time,203 seeking
Likert scale-type assessments of the judge’s knowledge of the law,
clarity of communication, courtroom demeanor, demonstrated impartiality, and similar issues related to procedural fairness.204 While bar
polls lack the comprehensive scope of state-sponsored evaluations,205
they nonetheless offer several important opportunities to lawyers interested in forming robust and nuanced impressions of judges. First,
bar polls are less prone to some of the transmission biases that occur
in direct conversation between lawyers; a lawyer responding to a series of well-constructed questions cannot slip into “shared reality” or
prioritize certain details as easily as she can in natural conversation.
Second, bar polls may provide a more formal sense of the judge’s reputation in the community, which serves both as a meaningful starting point for lawyers who have never encountered the judge and as a
useful point of comparison for lawyers who have encountered the
203. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Judicial Performance Evaluation (JPE), N.C. B. ASS’N,
http://www.ncbar.org/members/committees/jpe/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). A sample survey
used by the North Carolina Bar can be found at http://www.ncbar.org/media/
13009240/jpesurveysample.pdf.
205. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 110, at 61 63.
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judge and have an existing impression. Finally, thoughtfully constituted bar polls (as well as more formal evaluations) may benefit the judges themselves, by providing a clearer snapshot of their respective reputations within the local legal community. Judges who are surprised
with, or concerned about, the information contained in the bar polls
can modify their own behavior and actions in response or address misunderstandings within the bar directly. This is especially the case if
bar polls are paired with court metrics like average disposition times
and bench presence data, thereby providing a chance to compare and
contrast subjective reputation with objective information.
C. Strategies for Law Schools
Even though it is the most open of secrets, practicing attorneys
may be reluctant to have a candid conversation about the ways in
which they share and use secondhand information on judges. If practitioners are unwilling to discuss the issues directly, perhaps law
schools should. Professional responsibility classes rarely emphasize
the psychological and cognitive aspects of lawyering, although such
issues are directly relevant to client relationships, litigation and negotiation skills, and general professional judgment. 206 Law schools
might consider integrating a unit on the psychology of professional
decision-making into one or more courses generally and a unit on the
psychology of litigation strategy into litigation-oriented courses. Exposing law students to the notion that they can learn about judges by
seeking out secondhand information from colleagues, and how they
may process and prioritize that information in light of natural cognitive biases, might create a more self-aware generation of litigators
who are more motivated to improve the quality of the interpersonal
information they share.
VI. CONCLUSION
Gossip about judges is a rich source of information for litigation
attorneys. Evaluative secondhand information about a trial judge
helps an attorney predict outcomes of legal arguments or litigation
tactics by virtually previewing the judge’s reaction to those arguments and tactics. But gossip is only useful to the extent it is accurate and reliable. Bad gossip—which heavily distorts perceptions of
the judge’s previous actions and behaviors—has no beneficial predictive value.
206. This may be beginning to change, in part due to the emergence of some excellent
and accessible materials on these issues. See, e.g., PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON
KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE
FOR LAWYERS AND POLICY MAKERS (2010).
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Attorneys already examine the gossip they receive for certain indicia of accuracy and reliability. They compare this secondhand information to their own firsthand experience with the judge. They
consider the trustworthiness of the gossip’s source. And they take
into account how recently the events that spurred the gossip transpired. These vetting tools all fundamentally focus on the same question: How closely does secondhand information from the past reflect
what an encounter with the judge would be like today? The more the
secondhand source reflects recent, direct interaction with the judge,
the more likely the attorney will credit the secondhand information
in building a prediction model.
Certain trends in civil litigation, however, are threatening the
quality of even carefully vetted gossip about judges. Attorneys are
making strategic choices that deny them fuller opportunities to interact with judges in court, and direct interaction between bench and
bar is in decline. If current trends continue, generally accessible gossip will become more important for most attorneys even as it becomes
less reliable. In a worst-case scenario, most attorneys will only know
judges through rumor and caricature, a losing situation for lawyers
and judges alike.
Happily, that scenario is still avoidable, and the decline in direct
interaction can be reversed with some effort. Federal district judges
should consider holding more hearings, even if only by telephone or
videoconference, to allow the attorneys before them to have a fuller
picture of their judicial approach. Lawyers themselves should welcome more opportunities for courtroom observation and interaction,
even if that time spent is not directly billable to a client. In short,
quality gossip remains both possible and desirable, but the determinants of that quality rest with the lawyers who share secondhand
information about judges as part of their daily practice. Individual
attorney awareness of gossip’s strengths and weaknesses is a good
first step. Awareness within the community of lawyers—and a collective commitment to accurately reflecting the nuances of attorneyjudge interaction—would be an even more significant achievement.

